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On Her Majesty's Secret Service: Protecting the
Consumer in New York City*
Philip G. Schrag4
In 1969, as a staff attorney for the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, I
wrote an article describing my attempts to promote the rights of con-
sumers by bringing test cases in the New York State courts.' I described
the frustrations of litigating within a system that was fraught with
procedural hurdles and long delays, and concluded that the courts in
which I practiced were indifferent to the pressing needs of consumers
and to the reforming legal doctrines which might answer those needs.
Convinced that there had to be a more effective means of protecting
consumers than by lengthy test litigation, I left the Legal Defense Fund
to see what I could accomplish working as a government official within
the New York City Department of Consumer Affairs. This article is
based upon my fifteen month tenure with the Department's Law En-
forcement Division and is an attempt (1) to indicate the ways in which
governmental power can be used to protect consumers, (2) to give law
students an idea of the day-to-day activities and professional life-style
of one type of "public interest" lawyer, and (3) to suggest the ethical
conflicts felt by a civil libertarian who works in a law enforcement
office.
I. Getting It Together
Protecting the consumer against fraud has been the job of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission and various state consumer protection offices
or Attorney General's offices. Unfortunately, the records of most of
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coming book Counsel for the Deceived: Case Studies in Consutner Fraud to be published
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these offices have been abysmal. Inadequate funding, understaffing,
weak legislation, lack of public support, overbureaucratization and the
absence of any real sense of mission conspired to render government
agencies ineffective or, in some cases, servants of industry, while con-
sumer fraud flourished.
2
Ralph Nader sparked dramatic change. His publication of Unsafe
at Any Speed in 1965 and his subsequent activities created new de-
mands for consumer protection. As a result of Nader's expos6 of the
Federal Trade Commission in 1968,1 the FTC began undertaking wide-
spread reforms designed to increase its effectiveness as a consumer
protector.4 This same reforming impulse spread to state and local
government as well.
The New York City Council responded to consumer needs by creat-
ing a Department of Consumer Affairs with an Advisory Council and
the power to subpoena witnesses.0 Late in 1968, Mayor John Lindsay
appointed me Chairman of the Department's new Advisory Council.
While the City Council's action was a step in the right direction,
it had not gone far enough. The new Department of Consumer Af-
fairs was really only an amalgamation of the City's Department of
Markets (Weights and Measures) and its Department of Licenses (which
authorized fee-paying non-felons to operate cabarets, sidewalk cafes,
miniature golf courses, and one hundred and two other such industries
designated as "sensitive" during the course of fifty years of municipal li-
censing legislation). Although the Department's licensing jurisdiction
did cover a few occupations in which licensing might actually be a
useful tool of consumer protection-home improvement contractors,
used car dealers, and employment agencies-the staffing and jurisdic-
tion of the Department were not well geared to the modern functions
of such an agency, i.e., deterring and punishing consumer fraud.
To be effective the agency needed a new law, adequate funding,
and a vigorous staff with a tough image. Making the new law its
2. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSoCIATION, REPORT OF THE CoMMIssIoN TO STUDY TIlE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1969); CENTER FOR ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC ISSUES, Till NEW
JERSEY OFFICE OF CONSUMER PROTECroN-A PROMISE UNFULFILLED (1970); E. COx, R,
FELLMETH & J. SCHULZ, THE NADER REPORT ON THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (Black
Cat ed. 1970); Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1, 44-46 (1969).
3. E. Cox, R. FELLmETH & J. ScHULZ, supra note 2.
4. Address by B. Mezines to the Legal Committee of the Grocery Mfr's of America
entitled "The FTC Today," in FTC Release, Jan. 14, 1971.
5. New York City, Local Law 68, Sept. 10, 1968, as amended, NEW YORK CITY, N.Y.
ADMIN. CODE, Ch. 64 (Supp. 1971).
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first priority, the Advisory Council borrowed the best provisions of
other state and federal laws, added a few ideas of its own, and ended
up with one of the toughest consumer protection bills ever drafted.
Among its strongest provisions, the bill forbade all deception what-
ever in the sale of consumer goods or services, the extension of
consumer credit, or the collection of consumer debts; gave the Com-
missioner of Consumer Affairs the powers to issue regulations defining
".unconscionable" practices; and gave the Commissioner the power to
enforce the law by seeking in the courts substantial civil fines, tem-
porary and permanent injunctions, and/or mass restitution to be paid
to all defrauded persons.
7
As a result of Commissioner Bess NMyerson'sB tenacious lobbying,
a public campaign in support of the bill, an opposition caught off-
guard, and a little bit of luck, the New York City Council passed the
Advisory Council's Consumer Protection BillO substantially as it had
been drafted. Mayor Lindsay signed the bill in a City Hall ceremony
on December 30, 1969.
The following week, Commissioner Myerson asked me to join the
Department of Consumer Affairs. My primary responsibility was to
head a new Law Enforcement Division which would implement the
statute. I agreed on the condition that the City provide adequate
6. Tse bill provided for a $50 minimum dvil penalty in order to avoid the
"housing code trap," whereby judges frequently undercut housing code enforcement by
fining offenders only $5. We hoped the agency would cumulate violations and seek
substantial fines which the courts could not nullify.
7. We deliberately required the agency to go to court to obtain penalties or remedies,
rather than authorizing it to impose administrative penalties subject to judicial review.
To enable it legally to issue cease and desist orders, we would have had to create not
only a new investigative staff, but a separate, neutral staff of hearing officers as well.
Furthermore, although an administrative procedure would seem to expedite cases com-
pared to the slow pace of most litigation, sta)s pending appeal of administrative orders
are almost routine, so that the two-step procedure--administrative hearing and judicial
review-was likely, in important cases, to take longer than litigation. Finally, ve had
some doubt as to whether the City Council would pass a bill authorizing the agency it-
self to order remedies, particularly the important, drastic remedy of mass restitution.
8. Mayor Lindsay appointed Bess Myerson as Commissioner of Consumer Affairs
shortly after we finished drafting our bill. It is generally supposed that his motives were
primarily political; he was up for re-election in a matter of months, and many of the
city's Jews had defected from his camp because of the school decentralization controversy.
The appointment of a female Jewish television celebrity-a former Miss America-was a
brilliant political move. By accident or design it was also the best merit appointment he
could have made. Not only was Commissioner Myerson quick to learn the field (including
the legal aspects of consumer protection) and receptive to virtually all staff proposals, but
her fame and charisma enabled her to win crucial battles with heads of other City agen-
des, and to get almost any story about consumer fraud into the newspapers. She made
passage of the Advisory Council's Consumer Protection Bill the primary goal of her first
year in office.
9. NEW YORK Crry, N.Y., AnanN. CODF, ch. 64, tit. A (Supp. 1971) (printed in Appendix,
pp. 1600-03 infra).
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funding, by which I meant an annual budget of at least half a mil-
lion dollars.10 Commissioner Myerson went to bat for the money, but
found the Mayor's office spectacularly reluctant to provide any money
whatsoever to enforce the law. Finally, after an impassioned personal
appeal from Commissioner Myerson to the Mayor, the Bureau of the
Budget agreed to let the agency spend $100,000 on the new program,1
on the condition that it save an equal amount of money for the City
by not filling vacancies as they occurred among weights and measures
inspectors. 12
Over the course of the next year, we were able to obtain federal
grants to expand the Division and to open a number of neighborhood
complaint offices. The City's seed money proved sufficient; by the time
I left the Law Enforcement Division in July, 1971, it was operating
with more than half a million dollars and had forty-two employees.
Funding secured, the last problem was to hire a good staff. We put
together a very young, aggressive, and imaginative group of people.13
10. $500,000 is a very small amount of money in a city with an $8 billion budget,
that much is probably lost every year in arithmetic errors. However, the City does have
a chronic, massive budget problem, and must constantly battle over salary scales with
unions representing the uniformed services. It cannot afford to grant even small raises in
pay scales, because even small raises for the many thousands of workers New York City
employs throws the budget off badly. Since it is very difficult to plead poverty during
collective bargaining negotiations while granting funds to start new programs, there aren't
any new programs, even small ones.
11. The city does not really allocate money to agencies; it allots them specific lines.
Departments have very little discretion about how to use their budgets. Tie Bureau of the
Budget tells an agency, for example, that it may have sixteen lawyers, four economists,
sixty-five inspectors, two bookkeepers, three clerks, two stenographers and a messenger boy.
The $100,000 was enough to pay for me, two lawyers, two investigators, two secretaries,
and the use of a stenotype service. Commissioner Myerson used the usual dodge to
supplement this; she assigned to my Division a number of then vacant lines from other
parts of the Department. For example, we put one investigator on a cashier's line, my
Deputy, an experienced lawyer, had the civil service title of Senior Kosher Meat Inspector.
Unfortunately, wages are paid at the scale of the line, not that of the job being per-
formed.
12. During my term in City Government, I saw the Bureau of the Budget use this
technique--acceeding to a Commissioner's request in exchange for diminution in the
work force--more and more frequently. In the Department of Consumer Affairs, this re-
sulted, over an eighteen month period, in decimation of the inspectorial force, which de-
creased in size through retirements, resignations and transfers, from 200 men to fewer than
eighty men.
13. This was not an easy task. Very few jobs in the City of New York are exempt front
competitive civil service examination. The lawyers of the Corporation Council (the City's
Law Department), for example, are hired through the competitive Civil Service System. I
was quite sure that the lawyers who took such examinations, or even lawyers who did
well on them, were not necessarily the ones I wanted. To avoid the Civil Service SystemI attempted to distinguish our lawyers' jobs from those of the City lawyers generally, hop.
ing, of course, to persuade the Bureau of the Budget, the Department of Personnel, and
the Civil Service Commission that the Department of Consumer Affairs should not have
to select its lawyers from the same list from which all other lawyers who work for the
City are chosen.
It took the better part of a weekend to write formal job descriptions for thirty jobs,
each different from the job of attorney, each different also from each other. A few exam.
ples from our submission to the Budget Bureau:
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For lawyers, we went primarily to the Columbia Law School class of
1970, which was about to graduate. I'd taught a seminar at Columbia
in consumer protection the previous fall, and was able to persuade
several of my best students to join us upon graduation. Each lawyer
was assigned an investigator, the majority of whom were returned
Peace Corps volunteers or refugees from corporations. Each month,
as we got wealthier, we added staff-paraprofessionals, law students,
various kinds of assistants. Our median age, however, remained about
twenty-six.
II. Doing It
Since we were starting a new type of agency, we did not want to
begin by developing a rigid set of procedures; instead, almost every-
SENIOR CONSUMER FRAUD SPECIALIST-Assumes primary responsibility for
administering those sections of the Consumer Protection Act relating to deceptive
practices in areas other than unconscionability and consumer credit .... Authorizes
and supervises investigation of complaints where litigation is not needed .... Super-
vises the Consumer Fraud Specialists, the Deceptive Discount Researd Associate, the
Trade Disparagement Examiner, the Bait and Switch Advertising Examiner, the De-
ceptive Food Labeling Investigator, the Advertising Language Analyst, and the other
specialists with respect to that portion of their work involving deceptive practices.
Qualifications: A baccalaureate degree, expertise in consumer deception and decep-
tive trade practices, as demonstrated to the Commissioner of Consumer Affairs, and
two years legal training, [If we'd said three, it would have looked like we wanted an
attorney].
SUBSECTION "D" INJUNCTION ADMINISTRATOR-Analyzes ongoing violations
in depth and recommends seeking of the appropriate type of injunctive order ....
Supervises the Section Five Assurance Negotiators and the Discontinuance Assurance
Administrator with respect to injunctive aspects of Section Five assurances .... Where
appropriate, orders field investigations or research into particular problems presented
by a particular complaint. Qualifications: A baccalaureate degree, expertise in the field
of injunctions as demonstrated to the Commissioner of Consumer Affairs, and two years
legal education.
UNCONSCIONABILIIY SPECIALIST (A line for an investigator, not a law) er)-De-
tects and investigates current unconscionable schemes and drafts regulations specifi-
cally dealing with the unconscionable elements thereof .... Acts as liaison between
the Department and industry in a cooperative effort to eliminate unconscionable
sales practices .... Conducts on-going research into unconscionable sales practices
in New York City, including analy-zing firm and industry pricing structures in rela-
tion to selling practices, market conditions, and firm clientele. Qualifications: A bac-
calaureate degree, understanding of the concept of consumer unconscionability as
demonstrated to the Commissioner of Consumer Affairs, familiarity with court deci.
sions construing § 2-502 of the Uniform Commercial Code ... and negotiating and
drafting ability, as demonstrated to the Commissioner of Consumer Affairs.
We won only a partial victory. The lawyers would not be classified as "attorney," so
they would not be chosen from the City lawyers' list. But only three job titles would be
created for the Division---"Consumer Specialist" for the college-educated investigators:
"Senior Consumer Specialist" for the lawyers; and for myself, the most exotic official Civil
Service title in the City, the Consumer Advocate. Some day, competitive Civil Service tests
would be written for these positions, but we would be consulted on what types of ques-
tions would be asked. Meanwhile, we were free to hire anyone we pleaed. In this case,
the snail's pace of the City's bureaucracy worked to our advantage: a year and a half
later, no one had even begun to design a test, and the Commissioner still has complete
discretion in hiring.
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thing we did was experimental. Today, the agency is still in the process
of deciding what works and what does not, what is economical and
what is not, what can be justified and what cannot. We took our cases
primarily from the inspectors who serve as the Department of Con-
sumer Affairs' complaint bureau. The inspectors were receiving over
20,000 complaints a year.14 They resolved routine problems by
telephone mediation, and referred the serious problems (those com-
panies generating huge numbers of complaints) to us. We also got
some cases from our monitoring of advertisements, or from informa-
tion given to us by companies' disgruntled employees. At any given
time, we had approximately seventy companies under investigation,
and during the year we investigated a total of 180 companies, involv-
ing over 2300 individual consumer complaints. We obtained sixty-five
out-of-court settlements (formal assurances of discontinuance, or agree-
ments to change a company's advertising or collection practices), and
were involved in eleven court cases. The assurances and injunctions
we obtained entitled affected consumers to cancel contract obligations
and to get refunds of over $2 million, if they chose to exercise rights
of which they were notified.
These statistics, however, do not tell the more important and vex-
ing story of the Law Enforcement Division's disenchantment with a
traditional model of law enforcement and subsequent conversion to
a more aggressive one. I suppose that when we began to operate, we
had in mind a model of law enforcement procedure that might be
called the "judicial" model. In this model, the law enforcement agency
interviews witnesses, gathers facts, presents the facts and the issues
to a court, and asks the court to dispense justice. In such a system,
the only contact between the agency and the defendant prior to liti-
gation would probably be testimony by the prospective defendant's
officers pursuant to an investigative subpoena.
In reaction to the countless frustrations encountered in "judicial"
model cases, we gradually evolved a "direct action" model, by which
the agency, instead of or in addition to going to court, made a de-
termination that a company was engaging in very bad practices and
then sought out non-litigious methods of pressuring the company into
changing those practices. In other words, instead of participating as
14. The inspectors operate a twenty-four.hour-a.day, seven-day-a-week telephone and
mail complaint center. Nights and weekends, the center uses a tape recorder/call.back
system.
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advocates in a two-party court contest, we and the company partici-
pated as two of many actors in the marketplace generally.
While probably no case can be classified exclusively within either
the "judicial" or "direct action" model, I have selected three cases
which illustrate the typical legal, practical, and ethical problems char-
acteristic of each particular model.
A. The judicial Model: The Case of the Kidnapped Lawyers
When the Law Enforcement Division began to operate late in the
spring of 1970, I asked the Department's inspectors to refer to us the
companies which generated the most complaints, relative to their vol-
ume of business. The inspectors had received more complaints about
Kramer's Appliance Repair Company 5 than about any other service
store in the City, and had been utterly unable to obtain any coopera-
tion from the store's managers.
The complaint of Mr. and Mrs. Homer Strong was typical. When
their television broke, Mr. and Mrs. Strong, who live in the Borough
of Queens, looked in the Queens Yellow Pages for a repair shop. The
Kramer's advertisement was one of the largest in the book, so they
chose to call Kramer's, assuming that the size of the advertisement was
related to the size and reputation of the company. Kramer's answered
right away and immediately sent a repairman to the Strong home.
The man turned on the set and looked at the defective picture, but
did not look at the back of the television. He said he would have to
take the set to the shop for repair. Mr. Strong asked that Kramer's give
him an estimate of the price before performing any repairs, and the
repairman agreed.' He left with the set.
Three days later, the store called Mrs. Strong and said that the cost
of repairs would be $74.20. She told the man not to do any repair
work unless her husband called to authorize it. The following day
Mr. Strong called Kxamer's to say that the price was too high and the
15. All company names and individual names (except those of Department employees)
used in this article have been changed. I don't like changing names in a history, but I
feel that it is necessary here, in view of the immediacy of the events, to protect
privacy, to avoid the claim that I am unfairly commenting in print to influence pending
litigation, and, in one case, to honor a non-disclosure commitment I made while in office.
All dialogue contained in this article is reproduced to the best of my recollection. Di-
rect quotations of hearings testimony are condensations of stenographic transcripts.
16. In most cases, the repairmen told our complainants that an estimate would cost
$4, which the customers readily agreed to pay.
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work should not be done. The man at Kramer's said that the work
had already been done, and the set was in perfect working condition.
Mr. Strong felt he'd been taken, but figured there was nothing he could
do, so he agreed to pay for the repairs. The man said that payment
would have to be made in cash; the store did not accept personal checks,
on which payment could be stopped.
When a Kramer's repairman came to return the set, Mrs. Strong
discovered that it still did not work. Nevertheless, the repairman de-
manded payment in full and refused to leave the set in the house
unless she gave him the $74.20. She refused, and they argued for a
while, finally agreeing that if Mrs. Strong paid him $40 in cash, he
would leave the set, the balance of the money to be paid when the
repairs were completed. The delivery man indicated the set needed
only a minor adjustment which he could do in ten minutes the next
day.
The repairman called the next night and said he had to take
the set back to the shop; the adjustment could not be made without
dismantling the television. Reluctantly, the Strongs agreed to this pro.
cedure, and Kramer's said it would send a man.
They did not hear from Kramer's for a week. Then, one day, Mrs.
Strong found a note in her mailbox, scribbled on a Kramer's receipt
form: "Mr. Strong, it's all over. Forget you. Kramer's." When Mr.
Strong called Kramer's to protest, Kramer's sent a man to pick up the
set.
For a week, Mr. Strong called Kramer's to find out when the set
would be re-delivered. He could never get an answer. Finally a woman
called him to say that the set had been fixed, and $15.00 would be
added to his bill. Kramer's claimed that it had installed a new trans-
former. Protesting that Kramer's had previously told him his set had
been put in perfect working condition, Mr. Strong said that he would
not pay the additional charge. Kramer's refused to return the set, and
Strong complained to the Department.
The inspectors had discovered that Kramer's had no Queens re-
pair shop at all. Despite its prominent advertisement in the Queens
Yellow Pages, its only premises consisted of a small storefront in the
Sheepshead Bay section of Brooklyn, near Coney Island.
Stephen Newman and Bruce Ratner, both former students of mine,
got the case. Newman assigned a law student to visit Kramer's and size
the place up and, if necessary, to serve a subpoena. (In New York,
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personal service is required for investigative subpoenas) The student
made an appointment to meet Mr. Sam Kramer, the owner, at the
store one morning, but when he got there the store was locked (the
Yellow Pages advertisement indicated that it was open twenty-four
hours a day). He telephoned the store, and Mrs. Kramer, evidently
speaking from her home, answered. She said that Mr. Kramer would
come right over. When Kramer arrived, the student tried to discuss a
few complaints with him, but got nowhere, so as he was leaving, he
served the subpoena on Kramer.
On the day of the hearing, Kramer appeared with Irving F. Raskin,
his attorney. When the questioning started, Raskin became obstructive,
ordering his client not to answer most of the questions.
For example:
Newman: How many employees do you have there?
Raskin: I don't want to clutter up the record with my objections;
however, the purpose of this hearing and the purpose of your or-
ganization is to check into fraudulent trade practices .... I will
ask my client not to answer these irrelevant questions ....
Newman: We wish to find out whether Mr. Kramer is a single
employee and therefore may be having trouble with a large
volume of T.V. sets.
Raskin: Is it your position that if he has too large a volume of
work that this constitutes an unfair trade practice?... I deem it
objectionable.
Newman: Do you employ any people who repair any T.V. sets?
Raskin: That is objectionable and he will not answer.
Newman: What percentage of your business is derived from re-
pairs of T.V. sets?
Raskin: Objection.
Newman: Would you state your objection?
Raskin: Objection is that these are vague, general questions which
have no relevance to a fraud situation ....
Newman: What is the average time you keep a T.V. in the shop
for repairs?
Raskin: Objection, and may I add, it is an impossible question for
17. Although the law permits service of a summons by mail and aflfixation to the re-
spondent's door where personal service cannot be made, and provides that a subpoena
shall be served in the same manner as a summons, it also requires that proof of such
service be filed within twenty days with the clerk of the court named in the summons.
No court is named in an investigative subpoena, and the clerks have no authority to ac-
cept the filing of proof of service of something other than a document pertaining to a
suit. Therefore, we had some doubt as to whether non-personal service of an investigatory
subpoena was legal, and the City's Corporation Counsel advised us informally that only
personal service would be valid. Furthermore, non-personal service is not %alid until ten
,days after filing with the clerk. N.Y. Cw. PRAc. §§ 308, 2303 PfcKinney, 1963).
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any T.V. repairman to answer. It is like asking what is the average
time that a legal matter stays in the attorney's office. It just cannot
be answered ....
Newman: Did you receive complaints in 1970?
Raskin: Objection. I certainly under no condition will allow my
client to be in the position to give you information as to that, so
that you can now get together a case against him. I will not put
him in that position .... The number of complaints that Mr. Kra.
mer had received, if any, has no relevance to this hearing.
The hearing record was a shambles. Despite this, we determined to
sue Kramer's. We held a strategy meeting and decided that to bolster
our case, we would rely not only on the testimony of complainants,
but we'd have a customer whose set had just been repaired by Kramer's
take the set immediately to an honest repair company and obtain an
independent assessment.
Just as our strategy meeting was concluding, an inspector came into
my office and announced that a police photographer had just been
gypped terribly by Kramer's repair shop. We instructed the po.
liceman to take his set immediately to a repair store authorized by
the company that had manufactured it. After examining the set, the
repairman wrote to the Department that although Kramer's had
charged the policeman $45.58 for the replacement or repair of two
condensers, a circuit breaker, the tuner, and for realignment, "the set
had only a new circuit breaker installed recently. Other than that there
is no sign of anything else replaced or touched recently. The set has a
covering of dust over the entire chassis and picture tube high voltage
lead. It is hardly possible to work on the under part of the chassis
without leaving traces of handling somewhere on these parts. There-
fore it seems to us that the set has not been taken out of the cabinet."
Meanwhile, we'd learned that Kramer was farming sets out for re-
pair to other shops. The proprietor of one such store told us that
Kramer occasionally cannibalized sets and sent them to him for repair
"with the guts hanging out." This man was discontinuing his associa-
tion with Kramer because he had sets taking up space in his shop which
Kramer hadn't picked up for three months. He also informed us that
Kramer had been convicted of forgery in 1966, for which he'd received
a three-month suspended sentence. He'd heard, too, that Kramer was
again in trouble with the federal authorities. We contacted the postal
inspectors, who told us they suspected Kramer of stealing checks from
the mails, but could not prove it.
This proprietor also told us that Harry's TV did work for
Kramer, and that Max Gordon, a former benchman for Harry's, was
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currently a benchman for Kramer. We determined to subpoena Gor-
don. Since that necessitated a long trip to the far reaches of Brooklyn,
we decided to subpoena Kramer again as well, hoping to hold a more
orderly hearing than before.
Newman and Ratner were dispatched to serve the subpoenas late in
October. They decided to try Gordon's house first. They rang the door-
bell and asked the man who answered, "Are you Max Gordon?"
"Yes," he said, puzzled.
"We have this for you," said Ratner, extending the paper and the
$2 witness fee.
Gordon opened the screen to see what the paper was, and Ratner
thrust it into the house.
'What's this?" Gordon asked, grabbing it.
"It's a subpoena."
"I'm not accepting this," Gordon shouted, letting the papers fall to
the floor.
Newman and Ratner let the screen door close and walked briskly
away from the house.
Pleased with themselves, and chuckling about how easy it had been,
the young lawyers began walking to the store to serve Kramer. By the
time they got there it was quite late at night. Through Kramer's
soaped-over window they could see a small light. No other store on
the isolated street was still open. They walked in.
The store had a small front room, which they entered. The room
was dark, and as they walked they had difficulty avoiding bumping
into televisions and chassis, which filled the area. From the front room,
a very narrow corridor led to a back office in which a bare bulb il-
luminated three men: a teen-age boy, an enormous Negro benchman,
and a red-headed, middle-aged man. Ratner and Newman started to
walk to the office, but the men stood up and blocked them in the
corridor.
"Is Mr. Kramer here?" asked Ratner.
"He's not in," said the Negro. Something in his manner suggested
that he was not surprised to see the lawyers.
"Where is he?"
"Europe."
"Do you expect him back soon?"
'We don't know when he'll be back."
Suddenly, a noise at the front door caused Ratner and Newman to
turn around. In walked Gordon, swinging a bunch of keys in his hand.
Sensing that Gordon intended to lock the door from the inside, New-
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man moved forward quickly, trying to get between Gordon and the
door. Gordon pushed his elbow into Newman's stomach, keeping him
from the door. He locked the door and put the keys in his pocket.
At this point Newman and Ratner abandoned their plan to serve
Kramer and started to think about how they were going to get out.
The four men surrounded them. The lawyers figured that they would
be lucky to get away with a small beating.
Gordon said, "These are the guys I just told you about."
"Please let us out," Newman pleaded.
"You're not going any place until I find out what this is about,"
said Gordon menacingly.
"We gave you the subpoena," said Newman. "Everything is ex-
plained in there. It's all written there." He was trying desperately to
avoid sounding flip. "Now please let us out."
"Who sent you?" asked Gordon.
"Philip Schrag," replied my good friend Newman.
"What's his phone number?"
"I don't know. You can call him at the office in the morning. Would
you let us out now please?"
"You're not getting out of here until I get his phone number and
call him."
During this conversation, Ratner had started to collect himself. I-e
remembered that he was a lawyer as well as a prisoner. "You are keep-
ing us here under arrest," he said. "We'll take legal action against
you if you don't let us out."
"Kidnapping, eh?" Gordon laughed.
"Don't laugh," warned Ratner. "It just might be kidnapping."
"What's Schrag's phone number?"
"We don't know," said Newman.
"This is false imprisonment," said Ratner. "You'll be liable both
civilly and criminally."
Gordon began to look worried. He looked around to his companions
for support.
The Negro spoke. "If they gave that paper to me," he said, "I'd
just put a bullet in 'em."
That made Gordon even more nervous. "Get the hell out of here,"
he said. He opened the door for Newman and Ratner.
A few minutes later, Gordon called me at my home. I hadn't yet
heard anything from Newman and Ratner. "I'm calling you to protest,
Mr. Schrag," he said. "Two fellows came to my house today and re-
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fused to identify themselves. Without saying a word, they threw a
subpoena at me and ran away. Is that any way to behave?"
I took his number and told him I'd call him back.
After a while, I reached Ratner and learned what actually had
happened. I called Gordon at his home, and his wife said he was at
Kramer's. Then I called Kramer's and asked for Gordon.
"He's not in," said a voice.
"Put him on," I said.
"There's no one here by that name," protested the voice.
"I know he's there. Put him on." I tried to sound tough.
Gordon came to the phone. "Mr. Gordon," I said, "when you called
me a little while ago, you neglected to tell me something."
'Vhat's that?"
"That you imprisoned two officials of the Department of Consumer
Affairs."
There was a pause. 'Well, I wasn't the one who locked the door."
"I think you were," I said. "And I don't care if you weren't. You
are going to sit down immediately and write letters of apology to Mr.
Newman and Mr. Ratner, and you are going to come to a hearing on
the return date of your subpoena."
"What if I don't show up?" he asked.
"Then we'll punish you," I said.
"What if I'm sick?"
'We'll still punish you."
The next day, Ratner and Newman received exquisitely hedged
letters from Gordon, handwritten on a page from a yellow pad:
Dear Mr. Newman:
I cannot tell you how embarrassed and ashamed I am at the inci-
dent which occurred on November 19, 1970. I was terribly upset at




On the day of the hearing, Gordon appeared, represented by Raskin.
Once again Raskin was obstructive, and no useful information was
obtained. However, Newman could sense that Gordon didn't really
know anything, so rather than apply for a court order compelling
Gordon to answer the questions, Newman decided that somehow he
would have to serve Kramer again and make a record for an order
compelling Kramer to answer.
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We began to compile papers for a lawsuit. We decided we needed
more expert testimony; we wanted to take no chances that we'd lose a
case against Kramer. RCA generously made available to the Depart-
ment a television set and the services of an expert technician who
caused the set to break by burning out a single resistor. We placed
this set in an investigator's home and then called Kramer's to repair
the set. Kramer's man came to the home, looked at the set, and took
it to the shop to be fixed. Five days later he returned it, asking the
investigator to pay $41.35 cash for repairs. The investigator demanded
an itemized receipt; it showed replacement or repair of three resistors,
three condensers and the tuner, as well as realignment. Our RCA tech-
nician determined that only the burnt-out resistor had been touched.
We also asked the municipal television station, WNYC-TV, for help.
That time we went all out. Its expert gave a set a complete examina-
tion and found it to be in perfect condition. He then inserted a single
defective tube. A competent repairman could have fixed it in the
owner's home. He painted the insides of the set with invisible ink,
and we put the television in another investigator's home. Kramer's
came and said the set had to be taken to the shop because there was a
"short in the transformer." They returned it for payment of $56.20,
with an itemized statement that they had replaced a tube, cleaned a
condenser, and aligned and cleaned the tuner. The WNYC-TV tech-
nician found that such work was neither necessary nor performed.1 8
Up to this point, we had not attempted to discuss individual com-
plaints with Kramer. But we had one low-income complainant for
whom the cost of repair represented a major burden, and who wanted
us to try to do something for her immediately. Ratner called Kramer
to discuss this case. Kramer angrily refused to return the woman's
television, or even let her test whether the set was working before she
paid for it.
We advised the complaining woman, and several others, to sue Kra-
mer's in Small Claims Court. The summons in that court is served
by registered mail, sent by the court clerk. In Kramer's case, however,
the envelopes from the clerk to Kramer, which had the name of the
court printed as a return address, were returned to the clerk unclaimed;
Kramer had simply refused them. The clerk then advised the con-
sumers to serve the summonses on Kramer themselves. We collected
18. Kramer often told his customers that they were receiving a real bargain. For
example, one lady wrote that Mr. Kramer told her that his prices were lower tian thod
of his competitors because "I overcharge niggers in Harlem 80% to 50%. They're un.
reliable so they don't deserve better."
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together a small brigade of Kramer complainants, and one of them
volunteered to go out and serve all of the Small Claims summonses.
He had no trouble serving Kramer at the store.
When Kramer did not appear in Small Claims Court, the customers
won judgments by default. But the default judgments were a hollow
victory; Kramer refused to pay the money customers were entitled to.
The customers then called City marshals, whose job it is to collect
judgments for a fee. Various marshals were contacted, but in each
case when a marshal's secretary heard that the amount involved was
under $100-which meant that the fee would be very small--she said
that the marshal was out of town and she didn't know when he'd be
back. The customers finally tried to employ the Sheriff, who is autho-
rized to levy on bank accounts to collect judgments. The Sheriff, how-
ever, could not locate any bank account for Kramer.
At this time, the 1971 Queens Yellow Pages were published. The
first ad we looked up was Kramer's. We were astonished. This year
Kramer's advertisement listed addresses for four Queens locations.
We were pretty sure his only store was in Sheepshead Bay, so we
checked the Queens addresses. One was an empty storefront, one
a town house, one a vacant lot, and one an intersection with no tele-
vision repair shop.
Commissioner Myerson wrote to the president of the telephone com-
pany, reciting not only the fraud in the Yellow Pages, but Kramer's
activities generally. He designated company vice-president Walter Bohn
to meet with us. In an exploratory switch to the direct action strat-
egy, we asked Mr. Bohn to prevent deception through the Yellow Pages
by changing Kramer's telephone number, without putting a recording
on the old number informing callers of the new number. In other
words, -the telephone company could neutralize its own false advertise-
ment by rendering the listed number inoperable, without depriving
Kramer's of telephone service altogether.
Bohn was unwilling to do this. Although the telephone company
did not condone falsehood, he told us, it could not legally discriminate
against a user. We pointed out that punishing a fraudulent advertiser
was hardly discrimination, but he said that the company could only
insist that Kramer's future advertising be true.
We proposed several alternative suggestions: putting a tape record-
ing on Kramer's number that would tell customers that the advertise-
ment was false before ringing at Kramer's store; printing a notice in
Kramer's advertisement in the Brooklyn Yellow Pages, about to be
published, that Kramer's Queens Yellow Pages advertising was false;
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and printing a full-page on the inside cover of all future Yellow Pages
warning consumers that the advertising in the book might be fraudu-
lent and should not necessarily be believed. Bohn rejected each sugges-
tion.
We then told him that if the telephone company refused to do any-
thing to correct false advertising it had published, and refused to warn
the public that Yellow Pages advertising was unreliable, Commissioner
Myerson might have to call a press conference to warn the public about
the Yellow Pages. Suddenly Mr. Bohn indicated that he would pass
the Kramer's case along to higher company officials who would decide
whether to take punitive action against Kramer's.
Bohn called soon afterward to tell me that the telephone company
agreed that action should be taken; it would disconnect Kramer's
number and substitute a new one, as we'd originally asked. But later
the same day, Bohn informed me that when he'd told this to Kramer,
Kramer said he'd sue the telephone company. As a matter of courtesy,
the telephone company was giving Kramer a week to draft his legal
papers. Once again, we were back to the judicial model of dispute
settlement.
Although the Department of Consumer Affairs was not a party to
the suit, Bohn kept us informed and invited us to observe. When
Kramer asked for a preliminary injunction against the telephone com-
pany the judge requested that the attorneys for the parties confer in
his chambers with his law clerk.
At this meeting, Kramer was represented not by Raskin but by Ira
Borden, a Manhattan Democratic District Leader.19 The other par-
ticipants were the judge's law clerk, the telephone company lawyer, and
Stephen Newman.
The telephone company quickly copped out. Instead of supporting
its threatened action to change the telephone numbers, the telephone
company lawyer agreed with Borden that it didn't really want to act
against Kramer's but that the Department of Consumer Affairs was
forcing it to. The law clerk, a quiet gentleman of about forty-five,
was instinctively hostile to the Department, which was now cast in the
role of an instigator. All of the clerk's questions were hostile, and all
were directed at Newman, who found himself quite isolated. After
19. Politically connected lawyers often represented the companies we were fighting.
In the space of a few months, for example, we squared off against not only this District
Leader, but a former Regional Commissioner of the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, a former Counsel to Mayor Lindsay, a defeated candidate for Governor of
New York, and a defeated candidate for United States Senator.
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hearing Newman's replies, the clerk told him that the proper way to
proceed would be to commence the Department's own suit against
Kramer's and ask for an immediate injunction. Newman replied that
we were preparing to do that, but we had no illusions that we could
get the other side to agree to a quick submission to the court.
The law clerk left the room for a while. When he returned, he re-
lated that he had discussed the case with the chief clerk, who had said
that the Department was acting in a totalitarian manner. In light of
the chief clerk's views, the court's decision was rather predictable:
Motion for a temporary injunction is granted. It is undenied and
clear that plaintiff's business is substantially dependent upon busi-
ness received over the telephone .... The basis for the threatened
action is defendant's receipt of advice that the various addresses
listed by plaintiff as its warehouses in its advertisements in the
classified directories are not in fact plaintiff's warehouses. [Assum-
ing this charge is true,] the action threatened is disproportionate
to the wrong asserted. Other remedies are available including cor-
rection of the advertisement, not the substantially complete elim-
ination of the prime source of plaintiff's business.20
We decided to pursue the judicial model further by bringing our
own suit against Kramer's. 21 On April 16, 1971, we obtained a court
order permitting us to expedite the proceedings by commencing the
suit immediately and having our motion for a preliminary injunction
heard three days later, on Friday, April 19. There was just one hitch:
the order had to be served personally on Kramer that very day. Nat-
urally, I assigned the job of serving process on Kramer to two experts
-Newman and Ratner.
They drove to Brooklyn, taking with them their secretary, Gano
Stephens, in case getting into Kramer's presence required a female to
participate in a ruse. The trio reached the store late in the afternoon;
it was locked, and no one appeared to be inside. They decided to try
Kramer's home, in a nearby apartment complex.
Ratner and Stephens rang the doorbell of Kramer's apartment. A
woman, evidently Kramer's wife, answered. Gano Stephens introduced
20. Unfortunately, the need to keep the real names of the defendants secret prevents
me from giving a case citation for this and other court decisions quoted in this article.
21. By this time, the Department had the power to bring its own law suits. Previously.
the Department had to rely upon the City Corporation Counsel to bring necessary legal
action. The old system had occasioned even greater delay and formality than already
existed in the classic aspects of the "judicial" model. In one case, for e.xanple, after our
Department had drawn the appropriate summons, complaint, application for preliminary
injunction, and supporting affidavits, it took the City Corporation Counsel seventy.six
days before it got around to serving the defendant.
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herself. "I'm Jean Mailer," she said. "My husband and I"--she indi-
cated Bruce Ratner-"live downstairs. We've heard that the landlord
is thinking of making the building a cooperative, and we wanted to
find out what our neighbors in the building think of it."
Mrs. Kramer, delighted to hear that the building might be co-op'd,
let them in.
"Is your husband in?" asked Ratner.
"No, he's not."
"Can you tell us when he'll be back?" asked Stephens. "We want to
get the reactions of both adults in the family."
The telephone rang, and Mrs. Kramer answered it. "Kramers Appli.
ance Repairl" she said. There was a pause. Mrs. Kramer continued,
"Just shut up," she told the caller. "You got your television back in
good condition. Now stop complaining."
Another call came through just as she hung up. "Cash or no set,"
she told the customer.
Ratner and Stephens stretched out the visit as long as they could,
hoping that Kramer would come home. Fortunately, Mrs. Kramer kept
interrupting to take telephone calls for Kramer's. Finally, when it
became difficult to invent any further questions regarding Mrs. Kramer's
feelings about buying a cooperative apartment, Ratner and Stephens
left and rejoined Newman, who'd been waiting outside. Night had
fallen; the papers had to be served within a few hours. Feeling quite
depressed over their failure to serve Kramer, the group drove to a
nearby McDonald's for a hamburger.
After dinner, they drove back to Kramer's. Now a light was on in-
side; it might be Kramer. But they suspected that if they knocked, no
one would open the door, and even if the door were opened, they
would never get to Kramer. Furthermore, they had seen enough of
the inside of that store under similar conditions.
They went to a telephone booth in a bar across the street and dialed
911, the police emergency number. They had no idea whether the
police would help them, or whether legally the police could do so, but
they had nothing to lose. After they explained their mission, the pre-
cinct sergeant said that he would send a squad car to meet them outside
of Kramer's.
Just as the first car arrived another squad car drove by and they
flagged it down. Both cars pulled up in front of Kramer's, their red
lights flashing in the darkness. One policeman walked to the door with
Newman. The lawyers' depression had been replaced by a feeling that
all would go well. Newman knocked.
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"Who is it?" growled a voice. It sounded like Kramer.
"The police," said the cop.
Kramer opened the frosted-over door a crack. He could see only the
policeman, not Newman who was standing to one side. "Mr. Kramer?"
asked the cop.
"Yes .... "
"These gentlemen have some legal papers to serve upon you."
Newman stepped into Kramer's line of vision, and extended the pa-
pers. A disgusted expression captured Kramer's features. He started
to slam the door. Newman moved even more quickly, hurling the legal
papers at Kramer, so that they were swept in by the closing portal.
Kramer opened the door again and kicked the court order towards
the street. The papers hit the policeman in the shin.
"Now look here, Mr. Kramer," said the cop. "You've been served
with legal papers. You are required to take them. Now... pick...
them... up!"
Kramer bent down, picked up the papers, and disappeared into the
store. Newman and Ratner fell over themselves thanking the police-
men.
Two days later, NBC-TV carried a news story on the commencement
of this suit. An anonymous neighbor of Kramer's store called NBC to
say that immediately after the broadcast he saw three men carting
boxes of books and records away from the shop.
The motion was supposed to be heard in three days. I expected
Kramer's lawyer to ask me for a postponement, and I knew that if I
said no, the court would give him at least one postponement anyway;
it is virtually impossible to get a New York judge to deny adjourn-
ments. So I determined that if he asked for a postponement I would
grant it, provided he promised not to request another. Sure enough,
Borden called and we agreed to put the case off for one week. Borden
agreed that he would not ask for an additional postponement unless
there were a genuine emergency.
A week passed. The night before we were to go to court, Borden
requested a second one-week postponement. He said he had been
sick. I did what is never done among New York practitioners: I re-
fused the requested postponement.
He went to court and asked the judge to give him another week. I
explained the urgency of the case, and the fact that Borden had had
an extra week already, but the judge said, "The man says he's been
sick. A man is entitled to one adjournment so I'll give him a week,
1547
The Yale Law Journal
but I'll mark on the record that there can be no more adjournments."22
Two days before the case was to be heard, Borden called me. "Sorry,
Schrag," he said. "I'm withdrawing from the case. I can't get Kramer
to pay me the fee he owes me."
The next day, I received a call from ... Irving Raskin. "I've just
been retained by Kramer's," he said. "I need at least a week to fa-
miliarize myself with the case."
"The answer is no," I said. "You've been on this case from the be-
ginning. You represented Kramer at a hearing months ago."
He applied to the court. "A lawyer can't serve his client unless he
has time to familiarize himself with the case," the judge lectured me.
Another one week delay was granted.
We thought our motion for a temporary injunction was an open-
and-shut case. We'd filed numerous affidavits from complaining con-
sumers, as well as experts' affidavits in the three instances in which
we'd arranged for technicians to analyze the work Kramer's did. When
the delays finally came to an end we were most anxious to see how
Kramer would reply.
His response was amazing. He noted that the Department was cur-
rently supporting a bill to license TV repair shops, but no legislative
action had yet been taken. Therefore, he argued, "What the plaintiff
is attempting to do by judicial authority it has failed to do by legislative
enactment as of this date. It is highly discriminatory to set up a set of
rules for the defendant as the only licensed TV repair man and the
remainder of the industry to continue [sic] to operate without any
regulations at all."
Kramer said that the telephone company had insisted that he put
some Queens address in his Yellow Pages advertising, and that
when he said he had no such address, the telephone company salesman
advised him to do what other companies did-make up a few.
He denied he cheated people. He said he had a large business,
and some people were bound to be disgruntled. "I can name a number
of people who are quite satisfied and have congratulated and thanked
the defendant for its service, and such people are included in the
Republican National Committee, Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
IBM Company, New York Telephone Company, Democratic Party,
Paul O'Dwyer, Mayor Lindsay."
22. The judge may have meant that a man is morally entitled to delay: no such right
appears in the statute books.
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Kramer dismissed the expert technicians by saying that they were
"plants," not "actual consumers." "The court should merely bear in
mind this is one of those 'entrapment situations.' "
A few weeks later, the court rendered its decision:
Briefly stated, defendants are charged with an unlawful scheme
designed to force their customers to pay high bills for television
repairs which defendants falsely claim to have performed. A tem-
porary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, which is sparingly
granted upon a showing of a clear right to relief and the threat
of irreparable injury. Moreover, the sweeping injunction . . .
which plaintiff seeks, in effect, determines the litigation and gives
substantially the same relief that could be obtained by a final judg-
ment after trial. Such preliminary injunctions should be granted
only when necessity requires it.
Although defendants admit that they have falsely advertised in the
... telephone directory, this fact is insufficient in itself to prompt
a temporary injunction since many efficient and honest repair busi-
nesses in various fields of endeavor have one central repair shop
that services the entire City. Moreover, it is uncontested that de-
fendants' [business] encompasses repairs to thousands of television
sets each year. This court is quite hesitant at this time to pass final
judgment upon an entire enterprise on the basis of the purported
treatment of a small percentage of its customers [and defendants
deny that they cheated the customers who filed affidavits]. Accord-
ingly, the motion for a temporary injunction is denied without
prejudice to renewal thereof in the event that the defendants shall
fail to consent to an immediate trial of the action upon ten days
notice by the plaintiff of her readiness to go to trial.
This decision reinforced our growing reservations about the judi-
cial model of law enforcement. We were particularly upset by what
seemed to be a cavalier attitude toward the effects of false advertising
-the court appeared to be saying that the advertising of fictitious
locations did no harm because a store in Brooklyn nevertheless might
be able to service other boroughs.
Fortunately, the court did say that we could have an expedited trial.
Unless Kramer agreed to have a trial in ten days, he would face a new
motion for a temporary injunction. The next day we served Kramer's
lawyer with a demand for a trial in ten days. He refused to consent,
so our only option was to ask again for a preliminary injunction. To
our surprise, the court referred the new motion back to the judge who
had ruled against us the first time. We expected a better response, now
that Kramer had refused the court's suggestion of a quick trial. Fur-
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thermore, we knew that the court was faced with an all-or-nothing
decision this time, since the last day for trials before the three-month
summer court recess had now passed.
The court ruled:
Defendants refused to consent to immediate trial and, hence, the
instant motion was brought. Upon renewal, a perusal of the moving
affidavit fails to reveal any new evidentiary matter that might now
induce the court to grant the drastic relief that has been previously
denied .... Although the public interest demands that the serious
allegations of wrongdoing herein be resolved at the earliest possi-
ble date, the interests of justice also require that the defendant be
given at least a minimum period of time to prepare a proper
defense .... [The new motion is denied and] the present action
is given a trial preference and the parties are further ordered to
be ready for trial on the first trial day in October of 1971.
When I left the Department, the staff was looking forward to the
trial,23 while continuing to tell new complainants that the Department
was sorry, but there was nothing it could do about Kramer's. The com-
plainants could not understand why a City agency supported by their
tax dollars could not help them.
And a year after the transaction, Kramer's still had Mr. Strong's tele-
vision.
We had always regarded the Kramer's case as one of the strongest in
the office. The evidence was clear; not only did we have a concededly
false Yellow Pages advertisement and a substantial number of com-
plaints from consumers, but we had gone to great expense, relative to
our small budget, to obtain expert analyses of Kramer's work in rela-
tion to the store's promises, and in three out of three cases checked by
technicians, Kramer's had lied about the work performed. Furthermore,
because Kramer's was still holding our complainants' televisions after
months of Departmental complaint investigation, the equities seemed
strong for judicial intervention. Our confidence in the power of our
evidence was matched only by our incredulity at the unwillingness
of the court to act on it.
Most of the lawyers in the Department had just graduated from law
school. Cases like Kramer's were their first exposure to the behavior
23. In mid-summer, Raskin notified the Department that he wished to take Commis.
sioner Myerson's deposition. The Department felt constrained to resist; permitting what
the Department regarded as an unwarranted harassment of the Commissioner would set
a bad precedent. When Raskin persisted, the Department decided to resist the demand
in court. However, since litigation over the propriety of the proposed deposition had to
precede Kramer's trial, the judge's order setting a trial date was automatically nullified
and the trial postponed indefinitely.
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of courts. They were surprised that the first Kramer's decision was
made, for all practical purposes, not by a judge but by a law clerk who
had been instinctively hostile to our position. But that decision, at
least, might be justifiable, since we were asking a public utility to take
on a new, debatable responsibility to prevent fraud by one of its sub-
scribers.
The lawyers were puzzled by the second decision. To them, the fact
that it was possible to operate an honest city-wide repair service with
only a single location did not lead logically to the court's proposition
that the admission of false advertising by a dishonest company should
not prompt injunctive relief. And if the court was not persuaded by the
Department's experience with expert testers and by the testimony of
the technicians, how were we supposed to prove that a company regu-
larly violated the law? Theoretically, it might be possible to commission
a statistically valid opinion survey of a representative sample of a
company's customers, but their names and addresses were almost always
withheld from us, and even if we had the names, the cost of the survey,
at the going rate of approximately $50 an interview, would have
been enormous. Furthermore, if we had taken a survey and could
demonstrate that a company cheated five per cent of its customers,
would that galvanize a court into action? Five per cent could represent
a substantial number of people, but the court seemed concerned not
with numbers but with proportion. How often did a company have to
steal before a court would tell it to behave?
The third decision was the one that radicalized the young lawyers.
They had been cursed at, held captive, delayed and defeated in court,
but finally they had procured an order entitling them to a trial in ten
days. They informed the company of their readiness to present the
evidence in court, and the company mocked them. Yet when they
returned to court, the same judge who had set down the "ten day"
rule characterized their desire to have a trial immediately following
the ten days as failure to give the defendant "at least a minimum period
of time to prepare a proper defense." The second trial date set by the
court proved equally illusory.
Between the second and the third Kramer's decision, Deputy Com-
missioner Henry Stern and I visited the judge on other business; we
wanted to explore the possibility of sponsoring a seminar for judges,
to educate them about our problems in presenting cases to the courts
and obtaining judicial sympathy. This judge had known our Deputy
Commissioner for years, and the meeting was very cordial. He asked
us for an example of what we considered lack of sympathy from the
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judiciary; since his involvement with the Kramer's case appeared to
be over (we did not know that the renewed application for an injunc-
tion would be assigned to him), we described what happened in that
instance.
The judge listened and then replied, "Everyone comes into this
court wanting an immediate injunction, but I've been here a long time
and I've discovered that there's practically no case that can't wait until
the day after tomorrow. Injunctions are harsh remedies. They should
only be granted sparingly."
I pointed out that because of the clogged court calendars, parties had
to wait many months to get trials. Preliminary injunctions were often
the whole ball game because a company could cheat thousands of
people while the Department was waiting for a trial, and then could
go out of business.
He gave us a lecture that lasted ten or fifteen minutes. He knew that
even if he ordered an immediate trial, he said, the calendars were so
backlogged that we couldn't get one for six months. But that was our
fault, not his. We worked for the City of New York, and it was the
City that would not give the court sufficient funds to hire enough
secretaries or clerks. He observed, correctly, that the country claims to
believe in law and order, but its appropriations to courts and its acqui-
escence in tremendous court backlogs prove otherwise. Things would
get worse before they got better, he warned, and that was the fault of
the politicians, not the judges.
We were stunned. In large measure, the judge was right. Our prob-
lems stemmed not so much from judicial reluctance to grant relief on
the basis of sterile papers rather than trials, but that the machinery of
justice, including trials, had broken down, and nobody cared. Gazing
out his window the judge concluded, "There are felons out there going
free because the political leadership won't provide money for police,
prosecutors, defense counsel, courts, jails, rehabilitation or even for
the prevention of crime or the control of narcotics. You think you have
problems? If we ever do get more money to fund this court, I hope we
put it into crime control. Sure consumer fraud should be eliminated.
But we're short of resources and it's not the priority area."
We often brooded about the judge's sentiments. We all lived in the
City of New York, so it was obvious that there were more pressing prob-
lems than consumer fraud, including not only the high crime rate but
the deteriorating schools, the housing shortage, and more than any-
thing else, the tendency toward compartmentalization of the inner city
into pockets for an increasingly wealthy white middle class among an
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increasingly alienated, poor, black population. Should young lawyers
devote their resources to fighting consumer fraud, when so many worse
things were happening? Doubt about the priority to be given the
elimination of consumer fraud mingled with the depressing awareness
that law enforcement of any type was inevitably a negative activity.
The people we were fighting were making, fixing, or at least dis.
tributing things. They acted, and appeared to produce something tan-
gible. We reacted in a manner designed to prevent or stop something,
never to create.
Staff demoralization, however, was always cured by client contact.
The frustration of dealing with companies like Kramer's upset our
lawyers, but those frustrations nearly drove some consumers insane.
We talked to customers who had called Kramer's thirty or forty times,
pleading for the return of a television that was one of their few links
with the world. They had been insulted and abused, and that experi-
ence, no less than crime in the streets or drugs in the schools, had
increased their fury at urban society. We went on fighting consumer
fraud not, as the common wisdom would have it, to make the country
safe for "legitimate business" and the sale of ever more unnecessary
products, but to punish men who robbed not one victim at a time
at the end of a dark alley, but thousands of persons at the end of
a mail order plan, franchising scheme, door-to-door selling swindle or
mass media advertisement.
But cases such as Kramer's led to increasing cynicism about how
effective we could be by working through bureaucratic and judicial
channels. Our frustration and occasional rage led us to explore new
strategies and to discard some of the self-imposed restraints on tactics.
Gradually, our methods of investigation became less gentlemanly, and
our bite more ferocious.
B. The Direct Action Model
I. The Case of the Cut-Up Body
People sometimes ask me to describe the most outrageous case I ever
saw of exploitation of consumers. A leading candidate is the case of
Foolproof Protection, Inc., which sold burglar alarms door-to-door.
Virtually all the complaints about Foolproof came from low-income
people residing in the slums of New York: Harlem, the South Bronx,
the Lower East Side, Jamaica, Central Brooklyn. We heard the story
again and again. A salesman had come to the customer's home; in many
cases, he arrived within hours after the police had been notified that the
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person's house had been robbed.24 The company sold a remarkable
package designed to appeal to the residents of high-crime areas of the
City. A Foolproof alarm would be installed immediately which would
ring in the police station and in the house or apartment itself if the
home were robbed. The customer had a one-month free trial period,
and could also cancel at any time and have the alarm removed. The
customer was taking little or no risk, because the salesman knew that
the Foolproof company did not sue people who could not afford to
keep up their payments, nor did it garnishee their wages.
The price was only about $14 a month for three years (about $500
total), during which time the customer would not have to worry about
service because the company retained ownership of the alarm. At the
end of the three years the customer could buy the alarm for 550. For
a total of about $750 the company would give the customer an attach-
ment that would call the fire department in case of fire.
Bruce Ratner went to work on the case and found that almost
everything the company's salesmen said was a lie. The alarms did not
ring in the police or fire stations. The customers could not cancel at any
time or even within a month; the fine-print documents they signed obli-
gated them to pay for three years even if they decided they no longer
wanted the alarms. And of all companies in New York City, Foolproof
was the fifth most frequent user of the courts; only three banks and
the telephone company sued more often, making Foolproof the most
frequent plaintiff of all sellers of goods in New York.
Furthermore, the Fire Department's Division of Fire Prevention
was shocked when Ratner asked them to inspect the $750 model in-
stalled in a consumer's home. After this visit, the Fire Department
wrote to Commissioner Myerson:
While this system could conceivably cause an alarm to sound in
case of fire, its reliability and integrity are definitely compromised
by the use of unmarked, possibly inferior, and poorly installed
components and wiring method .... All of the alarm components,
switches, wire relay, siren, heat detectors, etc. are unlabelled or of
unknown origin. The entire system has been assembled and in-
stalled in a very low grade, poor workmanship manner.
This installation could by no means be acceptable by any known
electrical code or standard and its reliability as a fire and burglar
alarm is questionable.
Using standard price catalogue knowledge and labor time cost
24. We later learned that Foolproof salesmen carried police radios in their cars and
cruised to the site of a burglary.
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figures it is my opinion that the approximate cost of the material
for this alarm system, including labor and installation, would be
under $75.
It should be noted that my figure of $75 is a material/labor cost
judgment only, to which would have to be added a reasonable sum
for overhead and profit.25
The $75 worth of parts to which the Fire Department referred in-
cluded only a bell or siren, two dry cell batteries, a relay, a metal box
which was placed on the customer's wall, one toggle switch for testing,
an off/on switch, a few wires, pressure-sensitive switches fitted into the
customer's windows and, in the case of the $750 model, heat detectors.
If a window were opened, the switches would cause the alarm to sound;
however, because the alarm was of the inferior "open-circuit" type, it
would not sound upon the mere cutting of its wires. A burglar who
smashed the glass in a window and then reached in to cut the wire
before opening the window would not trigger the alarm.
By the time we learned the pattern of Foolproof's sales technique,
we'd had enough experience with the courts to know that we were
unlikely to obtain swift and effective justice by their invocation alone.20
But before deciding upon some other strategy, we determined to learn
everything there was to know about Foolproof. We got one early break
that significantly accelerated the detective work.
When Ratner began his investigation, he discovered that the com-
pany was one of the Department's licensees, 27 and, as such, had a greater
duty to disclose information than did other companies. We did not
have to resort to the usual subpoena-and-hearing route to learn about
Foolproof.
Ratner called the company and told them that he would like to visit
its premises with a Department accountant and inspect the books. The
official he spoke to readily agreed. But when Ratner and the accountant
arrived, the receptionist denied they had an appointment, said no
officers were on the premises, and refused them entrance.
After the Department sent Foolproof a formal letter of demand to
inspect the books, Sam Stone, Foolproof's president, requested a meet-
ing to which he brought his two attorneys. One was Richard Toole,
25. Letter from Joseph F. Connor, Assistant Chief, Division of Fire Prevention, New
York City Fire Department, to Commissioner Bess Myerson, Jan. 4, 1971.
26. See Part II(A) supra and Schrag, supra note 1.
27. In 1968, the City Council had passed a law, effective October 1, 1963, requiring
home improvement contractors in New York City to be licensed by the Department of
Consumer Affairs. See Nmv YORK Crrr, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE, d. 82, art. 42 (1970). Un-
fortunately, Foolproof had been granted a license without a thorough investigation.
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the company's full-time secretary and general counsel, who initiated
its dozens of lawsuits against consumers every week. The other was
Lister Young, a politically connected attorney whose son had been
appointed to a significant post in City government by Mayor Lindsay.
The message of his presence was not lost on us, but our reaction was
simply to get more angry and to prepare, as part of our developing
strategy, for the possibility of political intervention.
At the meeting, Foolproof agreed that Ratner and an accountant
would visit the company's offices and examine the records. We did not
divulge the purposes of the inspection.
The investigation revealed that we were dealing with a much larger
enterprise than appeared on the surface. Although the company's
midtown headquarters were unpretentious, it had seven or eight field
offices all over the City, from which fleets of door-to-door salesmen
operated. Each office served a particular area of the City; in some areas,
where it was useful in making sales, Foolproof employed an all-black
sales force. The company's salesmen had sold 16,000 alarms during its
three years of operation, forty-two per cent of them to persons who
earned less than $6000 per year. It had batteries of employees who
enforced collections from consumers slow to pay. The company's ac-
counts receivable amounted to over $4 million.
Its connections to the outside world were also impressive. Foolproof
was the only active subsidiary of Detective Systems, Inc., a holding
company which was publicly traded over the counter and listed every
day in the New York Times. The officers of Foolproof were identical
with those of Detective. The price of Detective stock had been rising
steadily and was currently selling at around $7 per share. The company
also had obtained over $1 million of loans from several well-known New
York banks. The loans were secured only by Foolproof's accounts
receivable.
In addition, Detective, the parent, had a stunning asset. It had
signed an agreement with a major New York Department store, which
I shall call Branson's, 28 to operate a "leased department" in the store's
various branches. A Branson's customer who wanted a burglar alarm
would be visited by a Foolproof's salesman; the customer would buy a
Foolproof alarm using his Branson's charge card, and would never
28. The size and reputation of the company are a significant part of the tale, but so
is the secrecy surrounding its name. The reader must take my word for it that Branson's
reputation is comparable with that of J.C. Penney's--a name I can safely use by way of
illustration since Penney's, with no New York City outlet, cannot be Branson's.
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know that he was not dealing with a Branson's employee. For the use of
its good name, Branson's would get a significant cut of the gross.
Ratner spent three days scrutinizing Foolproof's records-and three
nights too. During the day, Stone would sit by him and look constantly
over his shoulder, or talk to him nervously about what an honest com-
pany he ran and how anxious he was to obey all the laws. Sam Stone
sold from morning to night, and probably sold in his dreams as well.
Each day, Ratner listened patiently as Stone told him, for example,
that the burglar alarm industry in New York was a haven for fraud,
and that other companies were in flagrant violation of the law.
But at night, Stone would get tired and would head for his stately
home on the north shore of Long Island, leaving Ratner to lock up the
office. Then Ratner would start the day's work in earnest, examining
the business records until midnight, then hurrying home for a little
sleep before beating Stone into the office in the morning.
In this manner, Ratner sized up his adversary and gathered extremely
valuable information. For example, Stone told Ratner that the price of
the alarms -was high because the customer was paying for more than
the parts of the alarm and its installation; he was paying for three years
of service. But by painstaking analysis of service records late one night,
Ratner determined that the most frequent service Foolproof provided
was replacing dead dry cells, and that only a quarter of tie customers
ever requested even that much service.
Ratner also wanted to obtain, if possible, the names and addresses
of a substantial number of Foolproof's customers. Although we had a
few dozen complainants, many with sad stories of deception combined
with serious financial hardship, it would be difficult to present most of
them to a court. For a majority, testifying would be a serious psycho-
logical and financial burden, and their memories of the precise events
that had occurred years before were sufficiently imprecise that Fool-
proof would have demolished them on cross-examination. Obviously,
a complete list of Foolproof customers, from which witnesses could be
selected, would be very helpful.
Foolproof kept these names and addresses, as well as other pertinent
information, on three-by-five cards and on punched computer cards.
Ratner had heard Stone tell Foolproof's comptroller to give the De-
partment full cooperation. So at 8:30 one morning, before Stone ar-
rived, Ratner asked the comptroller to show him the three-by-five
cards.
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"Do you mind if I Xerox these?" he asked. "The Department will
pay the costs of duplication."
"No, go right ahead," the comptroller told him.
For twenty minutes, Ratner labored over the machine, wondering
how many names and addresses he could copy before someone changed
the rules. The comptroller kept turning around and looking at him,
and every time he did so, Ratner figured the jig was up; the question
was, would the comptroller insist not only on halting further copying,
but on surrender of the already copied names? At last the comptroller
stood up and walked over.
"Mr. Ratner," he said, "it just kills me to see a lawyer spending his
time doing clerical work. Here, let me get one of the girls to do this
copying for you, so you can do something more important." He had a
secretary copy the entire stack for Ratner.
Ratner's investigation of Foolproof's records also confirmed an im-
portant suspicion. The 1970 New York State Legislature had passed a
law providing that a person who signed a contract brought to him by
a door-to-door salesman could cancel the obligation within three days
by notifying the company of his intention to do so."0 The law also
provided that the salesman must notify the consumer of his right to
cancel by handing the customer a stiff, perforated card containing, in
English and Spanish, a prescribed, simple text. The notice said that if
the consumer wanted to cancel, all he had to do was tear off the bottom
half of the card, sign it, and mail it; the bottom half, by law, was pre.
addressed to the seller. Violations of this law were punishable neither
criminally nor civilly, but a consumer not properly notified of his right
to cancel continued to bear such a right until three days after the
company provided him with the statutorily required stiff card. As far
as Ratner could determine from the records, Foolproof had never
printed or distributed the cards to its new customers, although it had
made at least 1200 sales since the law became effective on September 1,
1970.
Finally, Ratner's very presence at Foolproof's offices produced one
surprising by-product. Two of the company's salesmen, disgruntled
because Foolproof had not been paying them at the rate promised,
contacted him and supplied him with extensive information about how
they had been trained to sell the company's products. For example,
their sales managers had instructed them to say that Foolproof had a
29. N.Y. PEns. PRoP. LAw art. 10(a) (McKinney Supp. 1970).
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policy of not suing customers who were in default. The salesmen were
shocked to learn that the policy was exactly the opposite.
When Ratner returned to the Department with an accurate profile
of the company, we reviewed our strategic options:
(1) We could sue Foolproof under the Consumer Protection Law.
This course of action would involve a minimum of several months
delay while we drew up all the necessary papers. Then, in view of the
decisions we were getting in other cases, it seemed likely that a court
would deny any request for a preliminary injunction against the com-
pany's sales tactics (especially since the company would point out that
it was nationally traded, and a decision before trial affecting practices
would have a serious impact on the stock). Finally, after more than a
year of preliminary grappling, we might get a trial, but our witnesses'
memories were already fading, and our case would not be an easy one
to win.
(2) We could institute a Departmental proceeding to revoke or
suspend the company's license as a home improvement contractor.
This course had the advantage that it could be commenced immedi-
ately, but we had the usual problem with the potential witnesses. We
asked one Departmental official, an old hand at such hearings, how
many consumer witnesses we would need to put on the stand to sustain
a decision against the company, and he suggested that several dozen
might be needed. Furthermore, this course did not really avoid delay.
Departmental licensing determinations were subject to review in a
series of three courts, and it was customary for the courts to grant stays
of suspensions or revocations for the year or more that review required.
During this time, Foolproof could continue to operate with impunity.
And even if the Department did revoke its license, and its determina-
tion were ultimately upheld, Foolproof could continue to collect its
$4 million from deceived ghetto consumers; it could even continue to
sell without a license, subject to the petty annoyance of defending
periodic misdemeanor charges for operating without a license, and
paying occasional fines if found guilty.
(3) We could contact the big institutions on whose credit and friend-
ship Foolproof thrived. The company could not last two months if the
banks refused to renew their thirty-day loans, and would be in serious
trouble if Branson's terminated the leased department. Unfortunately,
this course of direct action had the disadvantage of being unlikely to
work. Those institutions had to be considered foe, not friend, at least
for the present. While non-renewal of the loans would cause the
company's collapse, the collapse would in turn insure that the banks
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would be unable to get their money out of the company. The banks'
interests were intertwined with those of Foolproof, and we had no
reason to believe that even if the banks knew everything about Fool-
proof's business practices they would do anything differently. As for
Branson's, Foolproof provided the store with a substantial profit for
very little work.
However, we reasoned, the strategy of putting pressure on Foolproof
through its reputable cronies was not wrong, but only premature. For
example, if Foolproof's fraud were sufficiently exposed publicly, the
banks and Branson's might begin to fear that the glare of publicity
would reflect on them. Furthermore, although Foolproof was strong
and secure at the moment, if it began to falter its companion protectors
might be transformed into vultures, each eager to consume what was
left of the carcass before the others could react.
(4) We could take unprecedented unilateral action to strike the
company a hard and possibly mortal blow, based upon a violation that
was not its most serious, but one whose enforcement could be accom-
plished by direct action. The 1200 customers who had purchased
alarms since September 1, 1970, still had the right to cancel, because
Foolproof had never given them the perforated cards required by
law. If we notified the customers of this right, a substantial number
of them might exercise it, and each cancellation would deprive Fool-
proof of up to $550 in accounts receivable and would instantly reduce
the company's current income. Furthermore, the law specified that a
company whose contract is cancelled must refund payments made by
the consumer. Despite its $4 million in accounts receivable, Foolproof
was cash-short, and refunds would be damaging.
This strategy, too, had its shortcomings. First, if it killed the beast,
the fraud would be terminated; but if Foolproof were able to with.
stand it, we would have on our hands only a wounded animal, more
desperate than ever and probably more ready to engage in harsh collec-
tion techniques to survive. Second, there was a chance, although a very
minor one, that we were wrong about the law. The statute applied to
door-to-door sales and said nothing about leases, but Foolproof cast its
contract in the form of an installment lease with an option to purchase.
Foolproof might argue that it need not make refunds because the
statute did not apply. No cases had yet arisen under the new law,
Third, we had no really hard evidence that Foolproof had consistently
violated the law; we had only the absence of evidence that it had com-
plied. Fourth, if Foolproof claimed that the cancellation law did not
apply to it, or even if it conceded the law's application, it might sue the
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City for damages for inducing breach of contract. While we were likely
to win such a suit, we could just imagine how the City's ultra-cautious
law department, the Corporation Counsel, would react. (We even
feared that the Corporation Counsel would insist that a damage action
by Foolproof be settled, and that the Department refrain from further
punitive action against the company). Finally, we knew that Foolproof
had political connections, and there was an outside chance that we
would lose our jobs for engaging in direct rather than judicial action.
We were persuaded, however, that this company was so evil that it
would be an honor to be canned for punishing it.
We decided on this last strategy.
Our assault was carefully prepared for many weeks. We took pains
to keep our plans secret, lest Foolproof pre-empt our strike by making
its own, less flashy notification to its consumers, by suing to enjoin our
intended action (thus alerting the Corporation Counsel), or by invok-
ing political muscle. Only six persons in the Department, including
Commissioner Myerson, knew about our plan.
Taking the names and addresses of the 1200 post-September custom-
ers from the copied three by five cards, we prepared a mass mailing,
which we kept under lock and key. Each envelope to a customer con-
tained:
(1) a covering letter signed by Commissioner Myerson, in English
and Spanish, informing the customer of his right to cancel his burglar
alarm contract, and stating that under the law, if Foolproof did not
pick up the alarm within forty days, the customer could keep it along
with his money;
(2) two stamped post cards, one addressed to Foolproof, and one
addressed to the Department (as a check), each containing an identical
text: "To Foolproof Protection, Inc.: One of your salesmen sold me a
burglar alarm and installation and maintenance services at my home
after September 1, 1970. At no time did you inform me of my right
to cancel under New York Personal Property Law, Sections 425-430.
I now cancel. Within ten days send me the agreement I signed and all
the money paid you. My name and address is: ." This was
followed by a mailing label on which we had typed the consumer's
name and address. Thus, to cancel, the consumer had only to drop the
cards in the mail, as stated in the Commissioner's letter. He did not
even have to sign his name;
(3) a copy of the card, to be retained by the consumer;
(4) a formal opinion of the General Counsel of the Department
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and of the Consumer Advocate, that the law applied to Foolproof's
agreements;
(5) in case Foolproof reacted by suing people who cancelled and
stopped paying, a list of all of the OEO Legal Aid offices in the City;
and the kicker,
(6) to enable consumers to make a rational choice about cancellation,
a copy of the opinion we'd received from the Fire Department, that
the alarms were worth only 575, plus profit and overhead.
We also made several contingency plans, in anticipation of the com-
pany's possible reactions. For example, we thought it likely that the
company would sue some or all of the people who cancelled, and we
did not want the burden of testing the propriety of our action to fall
on their shoulders. So we prepared to sue Foolproof the day it de-
manded payment from any customer who cancelled. We would claim
that telling a person he owed money when actually he had can-
celled his contract was a misrepresentation of consumer rights under
the Consumer Protection Law. Thus we could immediately put the
applicability of the cancellation law into issue with no problem of a
dispute about the facts which would necessitate calling witnesses.
Finally, we prepared to obtain legal assistance immediately for anyone
who cancelled and was sued, so that the first person into court claiming
rights based upon our action would have good representation.
We also prepared to test the last missing piece of information, but to
do so at the last possible minute, lest our intentions be discovered by
Foolproof while there was time to pre-empt. After everything had been
prepared and the envelopes stamped, Ratner called Toole, and engaged
him in discourse concerning several minor aspects of the company's
forms. Even at this point we were prepared to abandon the plan it
there seemed any reason to do so. After about ten minutes of meander-
ing conversation, Ratner asked offhandedly, "By the way, has Foolproof
been giving out the three-day cancellation cards under last year's State
law?"
Equally offhandedly, Toole replied, "Oh, no, that's one of the laws
we haven't gotten around to complying with yet."
We mailed the letters early on a Friday morning, late in March.
That afternoon, as a matter of courtesy, Ratner went to see Stone to
tell him what we had done. Although Stone said that he would receive
him, the office was virtually empty when Ratner arrived; it seems likely
that a leak to the company occurred that morning, as soon as the mail-
ing was made known generally within the Department. Toole received
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Ratner and heard the news stonily. "We're very bitter about this, you
know," he said.
A few days later, I received a not entirely unanticipated telephone
call from one of the Mayor's aides. He was apoplectic. "'What gives
you the right to notify a company's customers that they can cancel
their contracts?" he screamed. "What law says you can do that? Where
is it in the statute books? I want a brief on my desk by nine o'clock
tomorrow showing me that you have that right. The Mayor works a
twenty-hour day to keep businesses from moving out of New York and
you scare them away! Did you research the Department's authority
to do this? Who made the final decision to do this, anyway?"
"Commissioner Myerson," I happily told him.
That stopped him, but just for a moment. "Did you consult the
Corporation Counsel?"
He ranted and raved for twenty minutes. At every chance he gave
me to speak, I described to him (as whoever had spoken to him from
the company had not) what the company did to its customers. Even-
tually he came to see that this might not be one of the companies
that the Mayor worked day and night to keep in New York. Finally
he calmed down, retracted his demand for a brief, and insisted only
that he be notified before the Department again sent out such a mail-
ing to a company's customers2 0
The results of the mailing were extremely gratifying. Over a three
week period, 376 customers cancelled, wiping out $190,000 of Fool-
proof's accounts receivable. Approximately 140 envelopes were re-
turned to the Department because the addressee had moved without
leaving a forwarding address. Of the remainder, thirty-five per cent of
the mailing's recipients cancelled. We kept a separate count of cus-
tomers with Spanish surnames, and the same proportion (thirty-five
per cent) of these customers cancelled.
One aspect of our mailing which we thought clever turned out to
be extremely important: we deliberately did not phrase our notice
in the form prescribed by the statute-the form which starts the three-
30. Since this was only one of several times that the Mayor's aides had intervened on
behalf of a company we were investigating, I was becoming disturbed by what seemed to
be lack of support in City Hall. However, I have been told, probably correctly, that the
Mayor's aides were substantially more jumpy and protective of business titan was le, and
that even they didn't really want to stop us from taking action that Commissioner Mhyeron
deemed justified, but they had to satisfy campaign contributors that they had done
something-they had made a call. In fact, they never called twice about the same case, and
Bess Myerson never once altered a decision or a policy in response to City Hall interven-
tion.
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day cancellation period running. Therefore, consumers who received
our mailing could cancel at any time, even after they were sued,
months or years later, unless Foolproof meanwhile sent them a new
notice in the proper statutory form. In the interim, the rights of con-
sumers slow to respond would be preserved, and Foolproof's books
would have to reflect the fact that all 1200 of its contracts since Sep-
tember 1, 1971 were in jeopardy. The majority of cancellation cards
were returned after the third day following the mailing. In addition
to demonstrating the importance of our tactics, this customer response
suggests that "cooling-off-period" laws, such as that in New York, which
provide only three days to think over a transaction may give buyers
insufficient time to make a decision.
Concurrent with our mailing, we decided to institute a license re-
vocation proceeding against Foolproof, on the theory that even if
final action in such a proceeding were months or years away, the De-
partment ought to begin such a case; it ought not allow its licensing
to tacitly approve the conduct of this public enemy. In the proceeding,
the Law Enforcement Division would prosecute and the Commissioner
would appoint a neutral, unbiased hearing officer to hear the case and
recommend a disposition. We served Foolproof with a complaint con-
taining a wide variety of allegations. We alleged twenty-seven different
instances of fraud or failure to perform by Foolproof, which we were
prepared to prove by testimony of consumer witnesses. In addition,
we listed eighteen other types of violation of the licensing law, such
as the company's failure to keep the Department informed of the
names of its salesmen or the location of its offices. One "count" in
this complaint referred to a brochure we had obtained in which Fool-
proof stated that it "saves 55 lives per month."
The witnesses lived in every part of the City, but each one had to
be interviewed before the hearing. Ratner sought the cooperation of
the Legal Aid Society, and set up evening interviewing schedules in
Legal Aid offices in every borough. As they talked to the complainants,
Ratner and his investigators became more and more angry, and deter-
mined to insure not only that Foolproof cease its fraudulent practices,
but that Sam Stone be stopped from repeating this pattern, using
other corporations, year after year.
Shortly before the hearing was scheduled to take place, Foolproof
made its move. It informed the Department, through the reputable
law firm of Downe, Sanders and Hammerman, that it wanted to nego-
tiate. The law firm explained to us, somewhat apologetically, that it
did corporate and securities work for Detective Systems, Foolproof's
1564
Vol. 80: 1529, 1971
Protecting the Consumer in New York City
holding company parent, and had been called specially into this case
because of the serious consequences that license action might have for
the parent as well as the subsidiary.
The demand for negotiation produced something of an internal
crisis within the Department. As everywhere, militancy was exhibited
in inverse proportion to seniority. The investigators, who had been
interviewing the victims day and night, were altogether opposed to
any compromise, and wanted simply to revoke the license. Ratner was
mildly opposed to discussions with Foolproof. I was mildly in favor.
The Commissioner settled it: a government agency had an obligation
to hear out a party, even if it rejected compromise.
So we heard out Foolproof's arguments for compromise, which were
astounding. First, Foolproof contended it was improper to punish the
company for the acts of a few door-to-door salesmen. The company
had instructed the salesmen to obey the law; Stone and the other cor-
porate officers hadn't known about the "55 lives" brochure, for example,
which had been written by one of the regional sales managers without
authorization. We should perhaps reprimand the individual salesmen,
but the corporation was not responsible. Second, if we did put Fool-
proof out of business, a vacuum would be created that would be
filled by smaller, less reputable companies which would be impossible
to control and would engage in even more vicious tactics. Finally,
Foolproof's lawyers told us, in tones reminiscent of the Mayor's aide,
to put this company out of business would adversely affect thousands
of stockholders and would cause the unemployment of hundreds of
employees, many of them black. Even if the company were as bad as
we said, were we prepared to cause such harm to innocent stockholders
and employees?
"Do you mean," asked Henry Stem, our Deputy Commissioner,
"that we can revoke the license of a little company that is cheating
people, but that we should be more hesitant to revoke the license of
a big company that is cheating even more people, because many em-
ployees would lose their jobs?"
"That's exactly what I mean," replied the man from Downe, Sanders
and Hammerman.
We decided that we had to negotiate, at least for a while. If hun-
dreds of people were threatened with unemployment, and we refused
even to talk, it might be difficult to convince City Hall of the propriety
of our strategy. If, on the other hand, we talked, and Foolproof re-
jected our terms, no matter how harsh, City Hall was most unlikely
to intervene. There is a significant difference between telling an agency
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to keep open the lines of communication and second-guessing the
agency's bargaining positions. We made up our minds that the settle-
ment, if one were negotiated, would be the toughest in the history
of consumer protection in the United States.
The negotiations lasted nearly a month, consuming days or half-
days per session. Stone himself and one of the Downe, Sanders lawyers
were present for all sessions. From time to time they brought Hugh
Wood, vice-president of Foolproof and Detective, Richard Toole, and
a variety of other Downe, Sanders attorneys. The negotiations had an
eerie character because neither side directly discussed its core interests
or its weaknesses. Our weak points were (1) our belief that if the nego-
tiations collapsed and we had to proceed with the licensing hearing,
real changes, after all appeals, might be two years away, and (2)
our fear that Foolproof would sue the City for l190,000 damages as
a result of our mailing. Their weak points were (1) their fear that
publicity, particularly publicity mentioning Detective, would depress
Detective's common stock, and (2) their fear that if the proceedings
heated up sufficiently, Branson's and the banks might turn against
them.
We insisted, as a precondition to the negotiations, that while we
were talking, Foolproof employees were not to contact the 376 cus-
tomers who had cancelled. We imagined that a new fleet of fast.talking
salesmen might try to salvage the company's receivables by persuading
the customers, perhaps for a small rebate, to rescind their cancella-
tions.
This ground rule established, we presented our demands for a final
agreement. One of our first concerns was to protect the people who
had cancelled, for whom we bore special responsibility because they
had acted upon our information. We wanted to see to it that Fool-
proof refunded their money, as it was obligated to do under the
statute. Foolproof, on the other hand, said it wanted to "renegotiate"
their contracts, in a fair and honest manner, and that it wanted to
offer the people who cancelled as much as a fifty per cent discount to
sign up again. The fact that it was in Foolproof's interest to contract
even at half price confirmed our belief as to the low value of the bur-
glar alarm. After several hours of discussion, we reached agreement on
this point: Foolproof could attempt a resale, by strictly truthful sales
techniques, but only one man could go to make the pitch, and he had to
physically hand a refund check to the customer who had cancelled
before he could even begin the resale pitch.
Our next concern was with refunds or cancellations for the people
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to whom Foolproof had sold alarms in the past-the people who owed
Foolproof $4 million. We wanted Foolproof to mail them a question-
naire to determine whether they had been deceived, and to refund
money to any customers who had been misled. Stone insisted that his
customers would lie, and would say they had been misled just to get
cash refunds. For days we circled this point, unable to reach any agree-
ment. Finally, I told Stone that since we insisted on the point, we had
better go ahead with the licensing proceeding, and with our other
plan for getting refunds for the customers.
"What other plan?" the lawyer asked.
"We're preparing a suit for mass restitution under the City's Con-
sumer Protection Law," I said. He looked puzzled, having been un-
aware of the law. I handed him a copy of the statute and explained
the nature of a mass restitution action.31 He quickly realized that not
only were all of Foolproof's assets threatened for the first time, but
that the pendency of such a suit would have to be disclosed in Detec-
tive's annual reports and future prospectuses to stockholders.
Stone asked if there might be some way to determine without a
mailing those few people who may have been misled. I explained an
alternate plan. Foolproof would pay $25,000 to hire an impartial arbi-
trator for a year and equip him with an office. We would mutually
agree on a procedure for selection of such a person, who, once hired,
could not be fired. He would use any means at his disposal, within
a year, to contact and personally interview Foolproof customers, and
his word would be final as to whether or not they had been misled.
Stone took this plan seriously enough so that we began drafting a
budget-$6000 for office space, $700 for Xerox, etc. However, by the
start of the next session, he had decided that he could not accept
the open-ended risk of losing all his contracts. His customers, he was
certain, would lie convincingly to the arbitrator.
Stone asked if we had any other plans. Ratner and I exchanged
glances. When we had drawn up our list of demands, we had drafted
a provision so radical that we had not even presented it to Stone. This
seemed to be the time to take it off the shelf and dust it off. "Mr.
Stone," I said, "you claim to want to run an honest business, but your
record is very bad. Your salesmen seem incapable of making an honest
presentation to a low-income consumer, and we view with alarm the
fact that the ghetto is your major market. Consumers who are less
31. See NEv YoRK Crry, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE, ch. 64, tiL A, § 2203d-4.0(c) (Supp. 1971)
(Appendix, p. 1602 infra.)
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educated are more easily taken in, and it is just these consumers who
can least afford to be cheated. We will abandon our demand for a
survey of your past customers if you agree to get out of the ghetto."
To our surprise, Stone readily agreed.
"No more sales to any customers having weekly salaries below $155,"
Ratner said. "And to police compliance, you will have to have your
customers fill out credit applications open to our inspection, stating
their salaries, and you cannot accept a contract unless the customer's
employer verifies that he earns more than $155."
Stone insisted on two modifications, which we agreed to: first, the
critical salary figure was to start at $100, rising to $155 on a sliding
scale over a period of nine months; and second, the limitations would
not apply to Branson's customers who had held Branson's charge ac-
counts for ninety days before buying an alarm.
Our next demand was that Foolproof employ a series of devices to
ensure that no customer with a legitimate grievance would be sued.
No customer could be sued for non-payment until Foolproof had sent
him a series of dunning letters encouraging him to notify the company
of any complaints, enclosing in each letter a self-addressed, stamped re-
ply post card on which complaints could be registered. The final letter
in this series had to include the following text: "Foolproof hopes you
are satisfied with your burglar alarm, which alerts you to intruders and,
as you know, does not ring at the police station. We told you before
installation that installation was not free, that there was no trial pe-
riod, and that your agreement could not be cancelled for three years.
If you have any complaints regarding sales, service or the above facts,
please mail us the enclosed card so that we can make whatever adjust-
ment is appropriate." The prestamped card enclosed with this final
dunning letter was to be addressed to Foolproof at a Post Office box
maintained by the Department; the Department would open the mail
and log the responses before sending them to the company.
Then, Foolproof would be required to put each complaining con-
sumer in the position he would have been in if the salesman had been
telling the truth. For example, if the customer had been told that the
alarm would ring in the police station, Foolproof would have to pro.
vide him with that type of alarm (sold commercially for approximately
$1000). If the customer had been told that he could cancel at any
time, he would have to be permitted to cancel.
Furthermore, if Foolproof sent a customer all of these notices and
received no response, it could sue him, but it would have to attach
to its summons a list of names and addresses of all the Legal Aid and
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OEO Legal Services offices in the City. After several negotiating ses-
sions, Stone accepted these restrictions.
Next, to ensure fair dealing in the future, we insisted that sales-
men take positive action to correct their former misrepresentations.
They would henceforth have a duty to disclose, orally and in writing,
that the alarms they were selling were not connected to the police
station,32 that Foolproof sues people who do not pay, and so forth.
Furthermore, before installing an alarm, Foolproof would have to
send each new customer a letter asking whether the salesman had
made each of the required affinnative disclosures, giving the customer
a stamped card for reply. No contract would be valid if the customer
reported that any disclosure had been omitted. Stone readily accepted
this demand also.
We had a number of less innovative demands as well: that Fool-
proof immediately settle the individual complaints that had been
filed with the Department, that Foolproof stipulate that any claims
it might have against the City for the mailing to customers were set-
tled (we raised this incidentally, although it concerned us throughout
the negotiations), that Foolproof accept a reprimand and fine on its
licensing record, and that the company pay the Department costs of
$2500. We also insisted that within twenty days after the out-of-court
settlement agreement was signed, Foolproof and Stone sign another
document consenting to a court judgment embodying, word-for-word,
the terms of the earlier agreement, so that Stone would be liable for
a jail sentence for contempt if he violated his promise.
Meanwhile, we neared agreement. Stone and his battery of lawyers
agreed to virtually every one of our demands. But there remained the
issue of publicity. Our Deputy Commissioner, Henry Stem, conducted
the discussions on publicity, meeting with Stone, his Vice-President
Hugh Wood, and Stone's lawyers. Stone requested the right to edit any
press release that the Department planned to issue, as a precondition
to his signing the complete agreement. Stern flatly refused to permit
"negotiation" of a press release, adding that he expected no press re-
lease would be issued until the subsequent judgment was entered,
approximately twenty days later. We expected that they would not
like the publicity, and didn't want them using it as an excuse to ter-
minate any relationship before they signed the consent to the entry
32. Stone had a pitch for every situation. To inform the customer that the alarm
would not be connected to a police station, Stone suggested that his salesmen say, "Mrs.
Jones, this alarm will ring in your home, frightening off the burglar without causing
unnecessary disruption by signaling the police."
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of judgment. They then made two demands to which the Department
agreed: that the release mention only Foolproof, not the publicly
traded parent, Detective; and that it not mention Branson's. A meet-
ing was scheduled for the afternoon of Friday, April 23, to sign the
settlement.
However, the day before the document was to be signed, we began
to get telephone calls from Foolproof customers who had cancelled.
Salesmen had come to their homes and frightened them into agreeing
to remain as customers. One customer complained that the Foolproof
salesman had kept his hand in his trenchcoat pocket, causing her to
fear that he had a gun. Foolproof was breaching our interim under-
standing that there would be a moratorium on visits. Furthermore, the
sales tactics were a violation of the provisions of the agreement govern-
ing conduct during any resale negotiations. Enraged, Ratner rushed to
the home of a customer which Foolproof had not yet revisited and
planted a tape recorder. That evening, Thursday, April 22, a Fool-
proof salesman called.
The next day, when Stone and his lawyers arrived to sign the agree-
ment, I protested about the visits. Stone admitted that visits had been
made, and claimed not to recall the interim understanding, which had
not been written down. But Stone insisted that the visits had been
conducted in accordance with the provisions of the agreement about
to be signed. Stone read the agreement and initialed each page; then
he and the lawyer from Downe, Sanders signed. I gave them copies
and filed the original away before commencing Act Two.
I next produced a small tape recorder and placed it on my desk. An
apprehensive look crossed Stone's face. "Now, Mr. Stone, I am going
to do your a favor. All along, you have complained that you were
innocent. Then, a few minutes ago, you assured me that your salesmen
when visiting customers who cancelled had not violated the terms we
had agreed upon for the procedure for such visits. I am now going to
demonstrate to you that even on the eve of signing this agreement,
you were not in control of your company, and you did not know what
your employees were doing." I turned on the recorder and played for
Stone and his lawyer the recording Ratner had made in Brooklyn the
previous night.
3
Salesman: Good evening. As you know, I'm here to explain about
that letter you received from the Department of Consumer Affairs,
33. The dialogue is an edited and partially paraphrased condensation of a conversation
which actually lasted forty-five minutes.
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You know, Bess Myerson wants to make a big name for herself, so
she can run for public office. And Foolproof is a big company, so its
books are open for inspection any time by the government. So Bess
Myerson sent some young punk up to our office to look over our
books, and while he was there this fellow noticed that a few of our
contracts were missing a clause required by a new law. We had
made up new contracts, but we accidentally used a few of the old
ones, and yours was one of them. So this punk, wanting to get a
pat on the back from some big supervisor,34 told Miss Myerson to
send out those letters.
Now you can cancel if you want to, but I'd just like to know
why you want to cancel, and find out if we did anything wrong.
Customer: Well, the salesman who came here told me the alarm
would make a loud noise, so that it could be heard all over the
neighborhood. But one day, my husband came in from work and
accidentally set off the alarm and he didn't know how to turn it
off. It rang for hours in the apartment, but nobody could hear it in
the street. When I came home from work later, I didn't even know
it was on until I actually entered our apartment. I don't think the
alarm works well because no one but the burglar can hear it.
Salesman: But that's not the company's fault. That's because you
have an old building. If you lived in a newer building, it could
be heard on the street.
Anyway, half the purpose is alerting you if you are asleep dur-
ing a burglary. Alerting neighbors to a break-in while you are
away from home is important, but the most important purpose of
a burglar alarm is to wake you up if there is a burglar in the house,
and frighten him off. After all, [the salesman's words become slow
and measured] a stereo, a hi-fi, a suit of clothes can always be re-
placed, [voice falls to a near-whisper] but God forbid, a cut-up
body will always bear a scar, or require an amputation.
The salesman let that sink in, and then continued his pitch. The
company, he told the woman, would be willing to make a reasonable
deal. First, he offered her a discount of $90 if she would recommit her-
self to retaining the alarm. When she refused this offer, he raised the
discount to $120, then $240, then $360, and finally to $400. She
consistently refused him, and finally he left the house. At no time did
the salesman hand her a refund check or make the disclosure required
by our understanding with Stone.
Stone and his lawyer sat mute for ten seconds after I turned off the
recorder. Then Stone picked up my telephone, dialed his office, and
told his sales manager, "Stop all re-selling immediately. I want to see
34. He got it; Ratner is now the City's Consumer Advocate.
1571
The Yale Law Journal
all the salesmen in the central office first thing Monday morning." I
began to think that the company might be capable of reform.
I was soon disillusioned. During the next few days, people who had
cancelled continued to call, reporting new visits by Foolproof salesmen
which did not comply with the terms of the agreement. Three times
within two weeks, we summoned Stone to the Department to explain
what appeared to be violations of the settlement. Each time he said that
he'd misunderstood the meaning of the settlement, and each time,
rather than sue Stone, we permitted him to sign a new stipulation,
clarifying the settlement and strengthening the enforcement provi-
sions. Twenty days passed, and on May 12, 1971, Stone and his at-
torney came to sign the consent to the entry of judgment. "Could you
do us a favor," he asked, "and hold up publicity on this for at least
ten days?" I assured him that the judgment would not be entered, nor
the press release issued, at least until Monday, May 24.
At about this time, other agencies, including the Federal Trade
Commission, the United States Attorney, and one of the District At-
torneys, began their own investigations of Foolproof. In addition, the
Attorney General of New Jersey, who had been working on the case for
several months, sued Foolproof for fraudulent practices in the sale of
its alarms there. On the first day of the suit, a court signed a temporary
restraining order enjoining Foolproof from collecting any money on
any outstanding contracts in New Jersey, or on any judgments it had
obtained in the New Jersey courts. We were amazed by the order, be-
cause the New Jersey courts seemed so much more prepared to deal
swiftly with consumer problems than their New York counterparts.
Stone was even more amazed, because the order immediately cut off
five per cent of his revenue. Coming only a few weeks after our mailing,
it was a serious financial blow to the company.
Also, Stone had disclosed to Branson's that he'd had some trouble
with the Department, but told the store that it was now settled. Bran-
son's lawyer came to see me, to ask what had happened. I gave him a
copy of the settlement, without making any recommendation that
Branson's take any action against Detective. I did ask that he give me a
copy of the contract between Branson's and Detective, and he refused.
This attitude confirmed my earlier suspicion that it would not have
been productive at the outset to ask Branson's not to deal with a com-
pany which cheated its customers.
On May 25, I took the papers that Stone had signed to the clerk's
office of the State Supreme Court for signature by the judge. An
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elderly clerk greeted me from behind the desk and took the papers.
He read through the decree, very slowly.
"This is improper," he said. "I'm going to recommend to the judge
that he not sign it."
"Why not?" I asked, worried because court clerks in New York
wield significant power; many judges rely on their judgment.
"This decree goes into too much detail, regulating every aspect of
this company's business."
"But that's necessary for enforcement," I argued. "We've got to
make it specific to make it work."
He shook his head. "Besides, it's too long, six pages single spaced.
Judgments shouldn't be so long. The judge shouldn't have to read so
many pages. And neither should I. It's an imposition. It's not my job."
"Is that all that is wrong with it?" I asked.
"No, that's not all. You have a long section in here regulating
their collection procedures. That's improper. When someone owes his
creditor money, the creditor should be able to collect any way he
wants to short of violence. This company sells to a lot of Negroes,
doesn't it?"
"Yes."
"Well you know as well as I do that Negroes don't pay their debts
on time."
"Many of these people have been defrauded," I told him. "They
need special protection so that they can defend themselves."
"Then let them come into court and defend themselves," he said.
"Look," I said, getting more worried, "this is nothing new. Attorney
General Lefkowitz has been getting consent decrees regulating selling
and collection practices for years."
"Lefkowitz is making it impossible for a man to run a business in
this state," the clerk replied. "And Lindsay is making it impossible to
run a business in the City. Lindsay is without a doubt the worst Mayor
New York ever had," he told me. "He even makes Wagner look good."
"Well, will you present these papers to the judge?" I asked.
"No, I told you I thought they were improper," he said. "But I will
present them to the chief clerk, with the recommendation that he
recommend to the judge that they not be signed. Come back in two
hours."
When I returned, he told me that the chief clerk had decided, against
his better judgment, to submit the papers to the judge without any
recommendation. An hour later, the judgment was signed.
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That afternoon, the Department issued a strong press release which
began, "A burglar alarm company that sold its alarms for seven times
their cost by falsely stating that some were connected to police stations
has consented to a court judgment halting its unfair sales practices."
The release mentioned the mailing we had undertaken, but, in accor-
dance with the Department's assurances, did not state the name of
the company's parent corporation. The New York Times described the
judgment on the first page of its second section the next day; other
newspapers gave the story minor coverage, or none at all.5 Publicity
did not affect the price of Detective stock, which hovered around
$7 per share.
Almost immediately, Foolproof began violating the judgment. Com-
plaints began to come in from new customers of the company as well
as from those who had cancelled their contracts. During this period,
we sent Stone a steady stream of individual complaints to resolve.
Although we pressed him regularly, he did not resolve them promptly.
His failure to pay prompt attention to the individual consumers who
said they had been gypped, together with the developing evidence of
continuing violations, caused us to summon him to yet another meet-
ing. We threatened enforcement action unless Stone agreed to pay a
new fine and to sign a new stipulation promising prompt refunds to
individuals who complained of deception. Stone said that he would
have to think it over; a few days later, he refused.
We then heard from a new law firm-Stone's fourth group of at-
torneys during our brief relationship-that all our future contact with
the company should be through them. My first contact with this firm
was a request that it supply me with copies of the Foolproof credit
applications which we were entitled to inspect under the provisions of
the agreement and judgment. The attorney I spoke to promised to
call me back with a response in three days. He never called back. Hav-
ing lived through this kind of delaying tactic in several other cases,
I was not prepared to beg repeatedly for documents that the Depart-
ment had a right to inspect.
These developments completely altered our relationship. Up to this
point the company and the Department had been circling each other,
feeling out areas of mutual agreement. The Department had used
each new piece of evidence to tighten the screw, but ever so slightly,
35. The Amsterdam News, New York's major black newspaper, did not pick up the
story until two months later, when it suddenly printed the press release In full.
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and Stone was becoming a familiar figure in the Department's offices.
Now we were dealing at more than arm's length, and it was total war.
A direct action rather than a judicial approach had worked thus
far, so we continued to apply that strategy. We had begun receiving
complaints from burglar alarm customers of Branson's, so we decided
to do our own investigating of the Branson-Foolproof set-up. Several
investigators posed as customers and asked Branson's to send a burglar
alarm salesman to their homes. They recorded the presentations, and
we found that even when selling under the Branson's name, Foolproof
salesmen were unable to restrain themselves from exaggeration. I in-
formed the general counsel of Branson's that we had evidence that
Branson's had been violating the City's Consumer Protection Law, and
requested that Branson's voluntarily supply the Department with vari-
ous documents concerning its sales of alarms, including its contract
with Foolproof. It was implicit that if voluntary cooperation was not
forthcoming, I would issue a subpoena.
Branson's sent one of its attorneys to see me. "We hate like the devil
to be investigated," he told me. "We didn't know anything about
Detective's tactics until we heard about them from the Department.
We'd had a few complaints, but they just seemed to indicate that there
were some overly zealous salesmen. We were impressed by the fact that
we were dealing with a publicly traded company. We felt that offered
us protection."
I told him that we had not reached any firm conclusions about
Branson's culpability, and that we were still investigating, which is why
we wanted the documents. He asked whether we would still insist on
investigating Branson's if they terminated their contract with Fool-
proof.
"If you're not selling any burglar alarms," I said, "I don't see how
we could fruitfully devote our resources to investigating your sale of
burglar alarms."
Branson's terminated its agreement with Detective the next week.
Even before that termination, Detective's stock had started to slip.
The slide began weeks after the publicity hit, but once it started,
it continued steadily. After Branson's terminated, the stock hit a low of
seventh eighths of a dollar.
And then a new development occurred which drastically changed the
character of the case. A man called to complain that he had bought
Detective stock at $7, on the recommendation of Optimum Analysis
Corp., a public relations firm. The firm had never mentioned that the
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company was in trouble, and immediately after his purchase, the price
of the stock had declined dramatically. He offered to send us a copy of
Optimum's report on the stock, and we urged him to do so.
The report was astonishing. Although it was dated "April, 1971"
and purported to be based upon information received from Sam Stone,
the company's president, it contained no mention of the $190,000 loss
caused by the consumer response to the Department's late March
mailing, or of the agreement signed late in April, or of the New
Jersey Attorney General's suit initiated late that month. Ratner went
to see Victor Berlin, president of Optimum.
Berlin, it developed, had first heard of Detective in March, 1971,
when he had received a letter from one of its attorneys, on the sta-
tionary of Downe, Sanders and Hammerman, requesting that Optimum
issue a report on the company in the near future. Berlin had agreed,
in large measure because the request had come from a prestigious law
firm. All during March and April, he had met with Stone and the
vice-president, Hugh Wood, and had received highly favorable infor-
mation indicating that the company would do well. On the basis of
the information, Berlin had written a glowing report, which Stone
signed, and had mailed it to over a hundred stock brokers in the New
York area. Stone and Wood had never mentioned that they were si-
multaneously in negotiations with Ratner and myself, nor had they said
anything about the 376 consumers who had cancelled their contracts.
A few weeks later, Berlin read in the newspapers that the company
had suffered unusual losses and had consented to a far-reaching judg-
ment. As the price of the stock fell, Optimum's clients became angry,
and accused Optimum of misleading them. Berlin's credibility had
been destroyed, and his attorneys were preparing a damage action
against Detective and Stone.
Impressed by the information they had received, Berlin and several
other employees of Optimum had themselves bought large quantities
of Detective stock at $7 a share. When the bottom dropped out, they
themselves had lost substantial sums.
"Incidentally," Berlin said, "watch that fellow Hugh Wood. He used
to be at Endowment National Bank, when the Bank gave Detective $1
million in loans. After that deal was completed, he left Endow-
ment to become a vice-president and director of Detective and Fool.
proof."
We watched him. We consulted the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission's Official Summary of stock transactions by corporate "insiders"
-- officers and directors. Wood had attended two of the sessions at which
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Stone and his lawyer had negotiated the agreement with the Depart-
ment of Consumer Affairs. That agreement was signed late in the
afternoon on Friday, April 26, 1971. The following Monday, weeks
before the agreement was publicized, Wood had sold 1200 shares of
Detective. It was not inconceivable that the company's insiders had
used Optimum to keep the price of the stock steady for a short period
while crucial sales were made. Commissioner Myerson advised the
S.E.C. to investigate. zo
The stock continued to fall. By consulting records at the S.E.C., we
36. Sam Stone knew a great deal about stock manipulations. With a noticeable degree
of envy he once told me what he claimed was the story of Budget Finance, Inc. See Schrag.
supra note 1. "At the time Budget began," Stone related, "there were a number of finance
companies buying three-year consumer contracts from slum stores. I was president of one
of them. But these contracts were with such poor people, and were subject to so many
legal defenses, that no finance company would pay a store more than seventy-five or
eighty percent of the face value for the right to collect the face value plus eighteen per
cent per annum from the consumer. The fellows at Budget decided to pay ninety-seven per
cent instead of seventy-five per cent, and they wiped out the competition.
"Although they knew the paper was uncollectable, they wrote the accounts receivable
up on their books for the full face value, and treated those accounts as current income in
the year in which the contracts were purchased. That made it look as though the com-
pany was very rich, and made it seem as though earnings were skyrocketing. Eventually,
the company went public, and people paid a pretty penny for the stock. The owners and
directors paid peanuts for their stock, of course.
"The more accounts receivable they had on the books, the more stock they were able
to sell. And the more stock they sold, the more the banks and other financial institutions
tripped over themselves to lend the company money. The banks were underbidding each
other to get Budget to borrow their money. Of course, the banks knew these assets existed
only on paper, and that many of them would be uncollectable. But they weren't inter-
ested in the contracts as security for the loans. The loans took priority over the Stock-
holders' equity. That was their security. Budget had raised $20 million through the sale
of stock, so the banks weren't really worried about losing their money.
"I once offered to lend Budget some money," Stone continued. "The president of the
company took me into his office and showed me his financial records. 'These books showv
that this year I made $1 million,' he told me.
"But I wasn't so dumb, you know. 'As I read the books,' I said, 'it looks like you lot
SI million this year.'
.'That just shows that you're not living in the jet age, Stone,' he told me. 'On the
basis of this statement I was able to sell $14 million worth of stock. So I lost $1 million.
I still got $13 million left.'
"The price of Budget Finance kept rising," Stone continued, "and the companys of-
ficers and directors kept buying shares at below-market prices. Eventually the company
was listed on the American Stock Exchange, and the price went higher. Meanwhile, the
company used a variety of accounting techniques to postpone its reported losses. Finally,
in 1969, the bubble broke. The company suddenly announced its discovery that not as
much money could be collected on its contracts as had previously been thought. It de-
clared a loss of about $20 million on contracts supposedly worth $40 million. Over the
course of a few months, the stock plummeted from $34 to $4. But the insiders sold all the
way down. Today some of them are millionaires. The company got out of the finance
business, but it had served its purpose.
"The consumers lost out, because Budget then sold their contracts, at a huge discount,
to another finance company, which was geared to use even stronger collection techniques
than Budget. But the major loss was suffered by the company's innocent stockholders,
whose investments were suddenly wiped out. The banks got out all their money, and
didn't lose a dime. The only commercial losers were the legitimate finance companies,
such as mine, which couldn't meet the competition of the ninety-seven per cent offer, and
the low-income retailers, which had no one else to sell their contracts to by the time
Budget folded."
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learned that while Stone claimed not to own any publicly traded shares
of Detective, and disclaimed beneficial ownership of his wife's shares,
he did own over $500,000 worth (at $7) of restricted shares, which
could not be sold on the market until the middle of 1972. The value of
these shares was wiped out. Berlin called us with a new discovery: the
previous owners of some of the shares he had bought while promoting
the stock were partners in the law firm of Downe, Sanders and Ham-
merman; they too had been selling.
Meanwhile, Foolproof was still selling alarms, and was still collect-
ing on old contracts, and Richard Toole was still suing consumers
at a furious rate, except in New Jersey, where the order obtained
by the Attorney General put us to shame. We had to act.
We drew up a new license revocation summons-this time, one
which would not require the presence or testimony of many consumer
witnesses. We made two kinds of allegations: first, that the officers of
the company were not of good moral character (a statutory standard
for home improvement contractors in New York City) because they
had violated the standards of conduct established by the federal secu-
rities laws, and second, that the company had violated its agreement
with the Department. We served the company with papers, calling for
it to appear on Monday morning, July 26, 1971.
I suspected that Foolproof's new lawyers would make some move
to block the hearing, and I did not want to inconvenience the Depart-
ment's witnesses by having them appear unnecessarily, so in the week
before the hearing I called Spencer Cates, who was now handling the
case for Foolproof. "Are you going to try to get a court order against
the hearing?" I asked.
"Yes, I am," said Cates.
"Will you tell me in which county of New York State you will ap-
ply for the order, so that I can be there to oppose you?"37
"No, I will not," he said.
I expected him to make his move on Friday afternoon, so that
morning I called the motions clerk in each nearby county and re-
quested that I be telephoned and called to the court if Spencer Cates
showed up trying to enjoin the Department of Consumer Affairs.
"What's the name of the company?" said the clerk in Queens,
"Foolproof Protection Inc.," I said.
37. A motion without notice can be made in any county. N.Y. Civ. PaAc. § 2212(b)
(Mclinney, 1963).
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"Oh, sure we'll call you," he said. "Everyone knows they're a bunch
of crooks. I've been reading about them in the newspapers."
Another clerk told me, "We won't call you, but we'll take this tele-
phone call into account in deciding whether to issue the stay."
A third clerk, in Brooklyn, said he might call.
The fourth clerk, in Manhattan, told me: "Manhattan never stays
a public agency."
By Friday night, I had heard nothing from either Gates or the clerks.
I concluded that we would have a hearing on Monday morning, and
advised the witnesses to appear.
At ten in the morning that Monday, the witnesses had arrived, the
hearing officer was seated at his desk, the prosecution was ready. But
neither Gates nor anyone from Foolproof had appeared. Nor had we
been served with any court papers. By 10:20, I knew something was
wrong. I called Gates, who wasn't in; his secretary said that he had
gone directly from his home to work on the Foolproof case. That could
have meant that he was on his way to the hearing. .. or it could have
meant trouble.
At 10:45, the hearing officer and the witnesses were getting restless.
We could have started without Foolproof, since the company had de-
faulted-that would have been pleasantly ironic, since it had obtained
thousands of judgments by default against consumers-but we thought
it better first to establish definitely whether they were absent on prin-
ciple or had merely been delayed in traffic. We opened the hearing
for the record, and then, before we put on any witnesses, I called Cates'
secretary again.
"Mr. Gates isn't here yet," I said. "Do you have any idea where he
might be?"
"All I know is he had some papers he went out to get signed."
"Can you tell me what county he headed for?"
"I think he said something about Queens."
That was all I needed to know, I called the motions clerk in Queens.
The man who answered was not the clerk who had read about Fool-
proof in the papers.
"Could you please call me if a Mr. Cates, representing Foolproof
Protection, Inc., shows up in your court seeking to stay a hearing by
the Department of Consumer Affairs?"
"Why, he's here at the desk in front of me right nowl" said the
clerk.
"Gould I come right out to oppose his application?" I asked.
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"How soon could you get here?"
"Twenty minutes."
"O.K., we'll wait twenty minutes," he said.
Ratner and I raced out to Queens. Cates was standing at the clerk's
counter. I asked him for a copy of his application papers.
"Do I have to give him a copy?" he asked the clerk. "This is the part
of the motions office for motions without notice. Schrag got notice
accidentally, but he wasn't entitled to notice."
"Better give him a copy," the clerk said. "The judge might want
to hear his side of it, too."
We leafed quickly through more than 100 pages of affidavits and
exhibits that Cates was presenting to the court. This was the move
we'd been waiting for-Foolproof and Detective were staking every-
thing on this motion, and throwing in all the ammunition they had,
This was not merely an application for a stay of the hearing, but an
application to hold a hearing on nullifying the consent judgment, so
that we would both start off again at day one. The only ground for
such an unusual demand is that the consent to the judgment was ob-
tained by fraud and duress, and that is just what Foolproof claimed.
In his affidavit, Stone gave his version of all that transpired, and
described the negotiations as he had perceived them. He told the court,
for example, "I signed the Assurance of Discontinuance most reluc-
tantly, with the licensing proceeding pending and the Sword of Dam-
ocles hanging over Foolproof's head, well-knowing that if the proceed-
ing were not settled, the chance of keeping Branson's was nil. I now
realize that in signing the Assurance of Discontinuance I was not un-
like Neville Chamberlain meeting with Adolf Hitler at Munich-I
gave an inch and they took a mile."
The judge, hearing motions "without notice" that week was an
elderly, retired judge filling in. He hadn't had time to read the papers.
"What's this case all about?" the judge asked Gates.
Cates explained that he was trying to re-open a judgment obtained
by fraud and duress by the Department, and to stay a Departmental
hearing until his motion to re-open had been decided. (If he won the
motion and reopened the judgment, half the grounds for the license
hearing would disappear).
"What harm will come if the Department's hearing were adjourned
for a couple of days while I refer this to the judge who hears cases
'with notice'?" the judge asked me.
I was very unhappy about the prospect of even a short stay because
of what I believe to be Newton's law of judicial inertia: a hearing,
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suit, or injunction in motion tends to remain in motion, but a pro-
ceeding that is stayed tends to remain stayed. I explained that the
company was alleged to be gypping low-income customers all the time,
that half a dozen government agencies were after it, and that the
proper procedure would be to let the hearing continue, subject to
Foolproof's right to apply for a stay if the Commissioner ruled against
the company and the company appealed the ruling. The judge was
not persuaded that there was any urgency. He virtually ordered me
to consent to a two-day postponement of the hearing. I did.
We drew up very brief reply papers and went to court, before an-
other judge, that Wednesday morning. This judge was vigorous, tough-
minded, serious, and legally oriented. The argument lasted fifteen or
twenty minutes and centered around the stay, since the judge made
it clear that he would not rule on the motion to vacate the judgmeni
until he'd read the papers. After he heard where things stood, he dis-
solved the stay. Cates was furious. He kept protesting, pressing his
argument. Although he'd made his decision, the judge heard Gates
out, then reaffirmed that the stay had been dissolved.
Cates stormed out of the courtroom. In the corridor, I told him that
the hearing would resume Friday morning. "Come hell or high water,
we won't be there," he said. We confirmed the date to him by tele-
gram.
True to his word, Gates did not show up on Friday. We presented
the first half of our witnesses, who testified about the company's stock
manipulations. The hearing was then adjourned until the following
week.
Late that afternoon, the judge ruled on Gates' motion to vacate the
consent judgment:
That branch of the motion which seeks to vacate and set aside or
modify the consent judgment is denied. To vacate the judgment
herein the burden is upon the movants to show fraud, coercion or
misrepresentation. Defendants have made no such credible show-
ing. The defendants knowingly and intentionally entered into a
legal and binding agreement. They were represented by counsel
and had adequate opportunity to refuse to the entry of the consent
judgment. As for the license hearing, the hearing is not in excess
of the Department's authority or jurisdiction nor can this court
assume that the hearing will be unreasonable, biased or unfair.
Lastly, defendants will have an adequate remedy for judicial re-
view in the event the hearing is adverse to their interests.
Now Stone was in very serious trouble. He had staked everything
on this legal maneuver, and he had lost. Branson's had deserted him,
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several government agencies were proceeding against him, and the
banks from which he borrowed were considering not renewing their
loans.35 If they did not renew, Detective would probably fold; it did
not have enough cash to repay.
Stone filed an immediate appeal. Within a few days, Gates and
Ratner stood before an appellate court clerk, waiting to see the judge
assigned for that week to motions in the appellate court. Since the
court had begun its summer recess, the appeal could not be heard for
months, but meanwhile, Gates was still pressing for a stay of the
Departmental hearing. The clerk pointed out to him, however, that
he had neglected to attach to his papers a copy of the judgment that
he was appealing. Lacking that, Gates could not see an appellate court
judge to apply for a stay until the next week.
The next week's judge was Thomas O'Hara, who nine months
earlier had sent to the Department of Consumer Affairs a copy of an
angry letter of complaint he'd mailed to a collection attorney. The
attorney had obtained a judgment against the judge's maid, arising
from her installment purchase of a vacuum cleaner. She had not re-
ceived the summons, however. It had been a typical case of what in
New York is called "sewer service"- the obtaining of default judg-
ments against debtors on the basis of perjured affidavits of service of
process. The attorney had dropped the case in response to the judge's
protest. His name was Richard Toole.
Ratner and Gates arrived at the court at 2:00 P.M. one day that next
week, and the clerks kept them waiting an hour while Judge O'Hara
looked at the papers. Then he summoned them to his chambers. Be.
fore they could sit down, he announced, "I'm going to deny this appli-
cation." Cates asked if he could at least argue the point. The judge
said that he could, but said he would deny the motion anyway. "Every.
38. The type of loan that Detective had obtained was called a "Chinese take-out" loan,
Several banks participated. Endowment National, which had first made the loan, lent only
for thirty days. At the end of that time, other, smaller banks, "took" Endowment "out" by
paying the money to Endowment and accepting the risk that Detective would not pay,
along with the interest for that month. Then, after another month, Endowment would
again take over the indebtedness.
I have tried to discover the purpose of this arrangement. Under federal law, banks are
not permitted to have more than a fixed percentage of their assets loaned to risky enter.
prises. They are not supposed to know in advance the schedules of the bank examiners,
But might they be so arranging their loans so as to have less money in risky ventures In
the month when they will be examined?
Now it was Endowment's turn to take over the loan. It refused, leaving the smaller banks
stuck with extending the term of the loan themselves, or calling the loan, But if they called
the loan, Detective was likely to go bankrupt, and they would lose all chance of collect-
ing. The banks would then have only the consumer contracts which secured the loan-
and would face a difficult battle with the Department if they tried to collect that money.
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body in New York knows about your company," he told Cates. "It's
common knowledge."
Gates argued that the Department had unfairly obtained the con-
sent judgment. The judge seemed bored. He interrupted Cates to say,
"I know this company. Mr. Richard Toole is involved in sewer service
and all kinds of things."
"You see," argued Gates, "that's just why we need the protection
of the court. Everyone has a bad impression of the company."
"I can't believe that it's unjustified," said Judge O'Hara. "I know
too much about this company."
Gates continued to argue, but to no avail. When he finished, the judge
said, "You fellows brought this on yourselves in the way you conducted
your sales. The corporation signed the consent judgment and was rep-
resented by counsel. Motion denied."
The appellate court's decision was the end of the line. The Depart-
ment completed its hearing, with Gates still refusing to participate,
and revoked Foolproof's license. The banks began to maneuver for
position, seeking tactical advantage before the collapse. One of the
small bank's attorneys called Ratner to say that Endowment National
had misled it into loaning money to Detective by misrepresenting the
value of the investment; 39 it wanted to know whether, if it foreclosed
and took over collecting the contracts, the Department would raise any
objections. Another one urged Ratner to permit the banks to collect
from consumers lest banks be deterred from lending to companies
selling in low-income areas. 'You wouldn't want to frighten banks
away from the poor," the bank officer told Ratner. "Foolproof and the
banks were working with the ghetto area people."
We began a series of weekly visits to the court, recording the names
and addresses of the people Foolproof sued. As soon as Toole filed
suit, we sent the defendants a letter advising them of a legal services
office willing to represent them. A volunteer lawyer-himself a collec-
tion attorney-attached himself to that office and began serving Toole
with hundreds of minteographed answers and demands for pre-trial
information, paralyzing Toole's use of the courts to collect Foolproof
debts.
The week I left the Department, a committee of bankers instructed
Stone to stop making sales, because selling expenses would reduce the
39. The small bank could theoretically sue Endowment for damages caused by any mis-
representation, but this course was practically foreclosed to it, the law)er said, because
small banks thrive on referrals of business by big banks, and a mmall bank that acted
uppity by suing a big bank would be blackballed in the banking community.
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salvage value of the company, and the banks' accountants took up resi-
dence in Foolproof's offices to insure that any money coming in from
consumers went straight to the banks. Two weeks later, Foolproof
filed a petition in bankruptcy and sought to make what the Bankruptcy
Act40 calls an "arrangement" with its corporate creditors, permitting it
to pay its debts to them at an agreed number of cents on the dollar.
But Ratner, following an obscure precedent,41 obtained an order from
the federal bankruptcy court enabling him to represent thousands of
forgotten "creditors"-the consumers who had been gypped over the
years and who should stop paying and receive funds. He won an order
permitting any consumer who filed a claim against the company in the
bankruptcy court to halt further installment payments.
As the company's collapse became total, Ratner was able to convince
the Bronx District Attorney's office to intensify its theretofore lackadai-
sical investigation. In the early autumn of 1971, a Bronx grand jury
indicted Stone on thirty-eight counts, including a charge of grand
larceny.
The District Attorney announced the indictments in a crowded press
conference, with nine television cameras whirring. Edward Thompson,
the tough-minded administrative judge of the Civil Court,42 learned
about Stone and his company for the first time through this publicity.
On his own, he searched his Court's records and discovered that Fool-
proof had won thousands of default judgments against consumers over
a two-year period. On his own motion, he instituted an unprecedented
action against Foolproof to reopen all of those judgments, meanwhile
staying all of the company's pending suits and its collections on past
judgments.
This action, the stay, its consequent cash squeeze and the attendant
publicity forced Stone to negotiate further. On the morning of the hear-
ing on the judge's motion, dozens of low-income consumers, most of
them black, filled the judge's anteroom. In his chambers, he hammered
out a settlement between Stone, Stone's lawyers, Ratner, the United
States Attorney, the New York State Attorney General and the bank-
ruptcy referee; Ratner and Stone (or in the event of their failure to
agree, the bankruptcy referee) would establish a "fair value" for the
40. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-99 (1970).
41. See Schrag, supra note 1, at 147-48, 152-55.
42. The Civil Court is the court in which companies sue to collect on installment con-
tracts. The Department could not bring suit under the Consumer Protection Law before
Judge Thompson, or in his court, because that court lacks equitable jurisdiction. N.Y, CiviL
COURT Act, § 202 (McKinney's 1963).
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alarm, taking into account the value of all affirmative defenses prob-
ably outstanding. Consumers would not have to pay more than this
amount, and if they had already paid more, they would be entitled to
refunds of the excess. Unfortunately, since the banks claimed to have
priority in bankruptcy over unsecured creditors, these refunds might
never be paid. But at the very least, millions of dollars would be saved
for poor consumers. This was the finest hour for consumer protection
in the City of New York, and only the third instance in which the
Department had won mass monetary relief, the novel new remedy pro-
vided by the Consumer Protection Law. Yet these events had come
about without judicial enforcement of that law, without its citation
or invocation in any court.43
2. The Case of the Secret Agent
The case that prompted us, during the spring of 1971, to evaluate
our own feelings about our investigative tactics came to us from a
salesgirl who resigned in disgust from Superior Research Enterprises,
Inc. She called us to report that the relatively new company, for which
she had worked only briefly, sold cheap books for a great deal of money.
Selling door-to-door, the company misled people to believe, among
other things, that it was connected with the famous children's televi-
sion show, Sesame Street.
She had gone to work for the company, she told us, after responding
to an advertisement for "interviewers" in the Village Voice, a popular
New York newspaper. The advertisement had not revealed that the
job was basically selling.
Then she had been instructed in "cold canvassing"--selling door-to-
door without previous appointment-as practiced by the company.
Using a new Sesame Street album as an entree, she was to determine
whether the home had children. If so, she was to engage the mother
of the house in conversation, ask a series of survey questions, and
then discuss the company's program, in which the mother could enroll.
Then she was to talk the mother into signing a contract for materials
to be delivered at a later date, which our informant felt were virtually
worthless.
Another young girl, who had also recently left the company, called
with a similar story a few days later. Although we had not received any
43. The other two cases in which the Department had obtained massive financial relief
were also instances in which it had pressured companies into disgorging the money. rather
than bringing an action in court.
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complaints from the company's consumers, we judged that this might
be the beginning of a fraudulent plan that would later generate many
complaints-possibly when the company began suing people who didn't
pay. We decided to investigate the company early enough to prevent
trouble, rather than waiting for hundreds of people to be swindled.
Our immediate problem was that neither girl could remember
exactly what she had been told to tell the mothers, and we had no
mothers reporting what had been said to them. We wanted an accurate
statement of what was said, to corroborate the girls and to give us
evidence for any subsequent proceeding.
We could have issued a subpoena and requested the company's
president to tell us what his employees' sales pitch was, but we knew
that he could postpone any hearing for months through a variety of
delaying tactics, and that when he finally testified he might deny
knowledge of what the salesgirls said or might tone down or color
the presentation for our benefit.
To get an accurate record quickly, we decided to get one of our own
employees a job working for the company. Sylvia Kronstadt was se.
lected. This was her first case since she'd graduated at the top of her
class at the University of Utah and come to work for our Department
as an investigator. She answered the advertisement Superior Research
placed in the Village Voice, and was asked to come for an interview
with the company's President, Ron Lumak. She packed a tape recorder
in her pocketbook.
Lumak turned out to be younger than she'd expected, short, and
very nervous. He talked quickly, while she completed the job applica-
tion. He was looking, he told her, for young women who were creative,
and who had a social conscience-women who wanted a creative
rather an a hum-drum job. "Selling the company's services," he said,
"requires creativity because every mother is different. You have to use
a different psychology on each one."
Although his company was only a year old, Lumak told Kronstadt
it already had 90,000 subscribers in New York. He employed about
sixty salesgirls who were given a one-day training session. After that,
they were driven each day by a crew manager to a lower middle-class
residential area of the City, where they sold a package of educational
materials produced by a company in Chicago.
The interview lasted forty-five minutes. Kronstadt drew upon her
true background, omitting only the week she'd worked with the De.
partment, and impressed Lumak as strongly as she'd impressed us.
Lumak offered her a job selling the company's services. "But," he said,
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"you really are smart. Wouldn't you rather work as my special assistant
here in the office, training salesgirls, interviewing candidates and work-
ing on the business records?"
Kronstadt drew a breath and thought for a moment. "I might,"
she said, "but first I'd like to try working in the field, to get a better
feel for the organization. Perhaps after a day or two of that I could
consider working here in the office." He suggested that she attend a
training session the next day, and she accepted, with a new cassette in
her recorder.
The trainer was a young woman, Delores West, who had worked
for the company since its start. She outlined the official sales presen-
tation to her trainees. "Hi," it began, "my name is . I'm
with Superior Research, and we're speaking to all the mothers in the
neighborhood about the new Sesame Street album. We've made it part
of our child development program for young children. Do you mind
if I ask you a few questions about your opinion on education?"
Then the salesgirl was to request entry into the home so that she
could use a table to write down the answers. "Which do you feel are
the most impressionable years in a person's life-childhood, adoles-
cence, or adulthood? Which institution had the greatest impact-
home, school or church? What type of employment is your husband
in?" No sales were to be made to the unemployed.
The salesgirls were instructed to pretend to record the answers to
the questions, and then to ask: "Are you familiar with the work of
the Children's Educational Workshop?4 Well, how about Project Head
Start? As you know, poor people have Head Start to give them an
educational advantage, and the rich have private schools, but the
middle class mother felt left out and wanted to have a program that
would provide her children with the same opportunities that other
children were receiving."
The salesgirl was then to list the "offerings" of the "Workshop":
(1) a "10-year information service," to which children could direct
"any questions" and receive tvo-to-twenty page research reports. (The
service is run by a Chicago company, which maintains thousands of
files responding to questions children frequently ask. Copies of the
prepackaged reports in the files are sent to subscribing families who
have purchased the service through hundreds of companies like Su-
perior Research located throughout the country.) West explained how
44. Children's Telev~i.on Workshop is the producer of Sesame StreeL
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to make mothers feel the need for the information service: "Get the
parent off-balance and insecure" by showing them examples of the "new
math"; make them feel that they cannot communicate with their chil-
dren about their education. Where mothers objected that their children
were too young to use the information service effectively, the sales-
girls were to refer to a Harvard experiment in which a five month old
child's IQ was increased fourteen points in three months;
(2) four pamphlets on child guidance, including articles on thumb
sucking, bed wetting and stealing. The salesgirls were to show the
mothers a poster illustrating these pamphlets. A banner heading on
the poster read "YOUR MOTHERS CLUB," as if the mothers were
being asked to join something rather than buy something;
(3) a fifteen to thirty-five per cent discount on purchases of prod.
ucts contained in a color catalog. "Flip through the catalog, and let
the mother see the pictures," said West, "but never let her pick it up
or examine it." The catalog bore no address, publisher's name or other
indication of origin, and contained no price list;
(4) "an exclusive option" to buy an Annual Events Book every year,
for $6;
(5) a "Career Guidance Chart." The chart consisted of one page,
with arrows pointing from interests to jobs, and indicated, for exam-
ple, that a child interested in gardening might have a career ahead
in the civil service;
(6) the right to purchase "educational materials" from the com-
pany for half price. No further details of this were given the salesgirls.
The girls were then to say, "Now, because of the new methods of
teaching, we're trying to enroll more mothers in our program. We are
currently giving premium inducements for joining the club." It was
illegal, West explained, to say that anything was free. The girls were
to use this phrasing so that the mother would "get that impression
anyway."
The items designated as "premium inducements"-a twelve-volume
set of children's books, a seven-volume science library, a dictionary, the
Sesame Street record album, and two posters-were the only materials
of any significant value. The mothers were supposed to see this while
suspecting that the salesgirls didn't, which would make the mothers feel
that they were taking advantage of the program.
"To close the sale," instructed West, "just assume that the mother
wants to join, and breeze right into closure. Never ask her to
'sign' anything. Get her signature by telling her to 'write down your
name for the office' or say, 'just O.K. this application here.' Don't
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tell them that the form is a contract, and don't tell them the total
price. If they ask, tell them that it only costs $.89 per week, but don't
tell them that they will have to pay for 297 weeks.
"If the mother appears hesitant after learning the price," West con-
tinued, "say, 'Aren't you strong enough as a mother to put away *.89
a week for your child's education?'
"After the mother has signed, tell her that the 'delivery boy' will
be in the area the next day to bring the books, and ask her whether
morning or evening is most convenient. Say that the program pre-
viously mailed the books, but since they were stolen half the time, we
now use our own delivery boys. It's important that the mother be
home when the delivery boy comes, because he's the real salesman.
He signs the mother up on a contract to pay at the rate of about $10
a month, and gives her a discount for her agreement to pay at this
accelerated rate.
"Incidentally, here's a little hint to improve your selling success.
Make up a few names and write them at the top of your enrollment
sheet, so that it will look like everyone in the neighborhood is join-
ing. And don't worry if your presentation isn't perfect for a few days.
These people never ask questions anyway, and most of them are so
dumb they don't know if what you're saying is right or not."
Lumak had been sitting at the side of the room. Now he broke in,
"The secret is to get them so hypnotized by your presentation that
they don't know what hit them. And remember, in dealing with the
consumer, people like us have to come down a few notches."
The next day, Larry Williams, an officer of the company, took
Kronstadt and Delores West out in the field to make sales. They drove
to Queens, where they met a man named Mike and a salesgirl named
Rose. Mike was a crew leader, a position he'd held in companies doing
this type of selling all over the country. He selected a neighborhood
for the day's canvassing. During the ride, Rose gave Kronstadt a few
more hints.
"Play on the mother's sympathy," she advised. "You're this poor,
hardworking young girl, trudging around in the rain or the heat, just
trying to make an honest living. They love you-they sit you down
and make you coffee, and you've got them in the palm of your hand.
It's all very woman to woman, and easy to clinch sales.
"What's bad is when you get into an area where the people are
pretty educated and they start asking you questions. When you hit a
block like that, forget it-they're too smart."
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"Delores, can I watch you make a presentation before I try it?"
asked Kronstadt. "I don't feel comfortable doing it alone."
After unsuccessfully trying to persuade Kronstadt that soliciting was
not difficult, West relented and agreed to give a demonstration. "I
didn't want to demonstrate for you," she said, "because the way I do
it is illegal. If there are only a few doing it this way, we don't get
caught. But if I teach people to do it this way, we'll probably get
caught." The tape recorder whirred away in Kronstadt's bag.
The car stopped in an Italian neighborhood. Kronstadt went with
West; the others fanned out. It took them twenty-five minutes before
they found a mother who spoke English. When they did, West asked
her if they might ask a "few questions from Superior Research" about
her opinions.
"Are you selling something?" asked the woman.
"Oh, no," said West. "We're just interviewing mothers about their
views on education."
The woman admitted them to her house, which consisted of several
small, cramped rooms. Her six children scampered in and out as
West explained the services of the "club" and invited her to join.
The woman said very little, and finally signed the contract.
Outside, West turned to Kronstadt. "Wasn't that awful?" she asked,
"I almost feel bad about that one. She was so stupid she would have
bought anything from anyone."
Kronstadt then left West, ostensibly to do her own canvassing. I-low-
ever, she instead returned to Manhattan and telephoned Lumak to
accept his offer to be his special assistant. He told her to report for
work the following Monday.
On her first day in the office, Lumak trained her. "The key word in
this job is control," he told her. "We are in control, and we must
remain in control. We don't ask people, we tell them. And we tell them
what we want them to know, when we want them to know it. The
psychology of this job is to never let anyone get that control from you.
"Control is all important. Everything I ever say professionally is pre-
pared in advance and memorized, including gestures, even laughs. From
now on, write down everything I do, and memorize it.
"When a job applicant calls, don't answer her questions. Just say that
the job involves field work, interviewing mothers in their homes about
a new educational program for their children, to see if the mothers
qualify. If they ask any questions, say that Ron will kill you if you talk
about it. Say that he likes to tell them about it himself."
"How do the applicants learn about sales jobs?" Kronstadt asked.
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"We run two ads a week, in the Village Voice and the New York
Times," Lumak replied. "The Civil Rights Law says we can't discrimi-
nate, so we have to solicit both male and female interviewers. If a man
calls, just tell him that the position is filled."
"How many salesgirls do you want to have?"
"There is no ceiling. The summer months are a peak period, with
college girls home for the summer. In June and July we could inter-
view up to a hundred girls a day for jobs. That's the main thing I want
you to do for now, concentrate on recruiting sales girls. When you
interview them, use the interview script exactly. I've worked it out in
detail, and every word has a purpose. And weed out the ones who ask a
lot of questions. If you get just one person like that into a training
session, they can ruin the whole thing-they can plant a seed of doubt
or suspicion in everyone's mind."
Kronstadt worked for Lumak for three days. For her, they were days
of intense emotional ambivalence. She knew the company was cheating
its customers, and believed in her real work, which was to document
the cheating. But at the same time, she was most unhappy in her under-
cover role. Lumak was talking to her out of trust; he already had a
genuinely warm feeling towards his new protege. As time passed,
Lumak, West and Kronstadt exchanged the small talk-about painting
the offices, what to have for lunch, their careers-on which office
friendships build. Lumak told Kronstadt of his background, and she
began to sympathize with him and lose her capacity for blame. He had
come from an immigrant family, and his hopes for self-improve-
ment had been dashed again and again. He had come to believe that
the only way to get ahead was over the backs of others.
Towards evening the second day. Lumak was sitting a few feet from
Kronstadt, but facing away from her. Her telephone rang. Calling from
the next desk, Lumak asked her to dinner, and she declined. During
the conversation, he never once turned to look at her.
She was left alone in the office for hours at a time. At first with
hesitation, then more confidently, she perused the company's files. She
learned the structure of the business and the types of forms used. She
copied the names and addresses of the company's sources of supply of
books and services. She found in the files an out of court settlement
which Lumak had signed with the State Attorney General the previous
year, on behalf of a similar but differently-named company. In it he
had agreed not to falsely describe the sales jobs for which his company
sought applicants. Kronstadt found the financial records, and calcu-
lated that the goods and services delivered, for which the consumer was
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charged $264.33, cost the company only $38. The ten-year information
service, for instance, cost the company $1 per subscriber.
She obtained the names of some subscribers from the files, so that
she could contact them to determine whether they had complaints. But
their dates of purchase were a year earlier, when Lumak had a different
company. She really needed the names of the current customers, which
Lumak kept in the top drawer of his own desk.
As it was, Kronstadt was frightened about rummaging through the
files. She would take a document to her desk to read, but when she
would hear a muffled sound in the corridor outside, she would quickly
run back to the file cabinet to return the document. She couldn't bring
herself to go through Lumak's desk.
Once Kronstadt had gathered enough information about Superior
Research Enterprises, she had Stephen Newman call Lumak to say that
she would not be in-that day or in the future. Newman said he was
a friend calling with the message that Sylvia Kronstadt was in North
Carolina visiting her dying grandmother. She had enjoyed her job, but
her grandmother's needs forced her to quit.
Later that day, however, the superintendent of the building next door
to Superior's offices called Kronstadt's own superintendent to say that
he had found Sylvia's wallet, which had been stolen, and which had her
landlord's telephone number on a scrap of paper inside. On her way to
retrieve the wallet, Kronstadt passed Superior's building. Unbeknownst
to her, Lumak was watching her from his window.
That evening, Kronstadt was working on a case at her home with
Dennis Grossman, another Department lawyer. Her studio apartment
was in a six-floor elevator building on a quiet street in mid-town
Manhattan. Since, at that time, she was still a relatively new arrival in
New York, the telephone company had not yet come to install a phone.
At 11:30, Grossman left the apartment and rode the elevator down-
stairs. As he opened the inside lobby door, he saw two young men study-
ing the names listed on the building's intercom system. He instantly
recognized them from Kronstadt's description as Ron Lumak and Larry
Williams. They spotted him at the same time that he saw them, and
Williams grabbed the door that Grossman had just opened. Grossman
blocked the entrance with his body.
"Does Sylvia Kronstadt live here?" Lumak asked. "She's not listed
on the buzzers."
"I don't know," said Grossman. "I never heard of her."
Both men shoved past Grossman at once, into the apartment lobby.
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"Hey, you can't do that," he called. "You can't go upstairs unless a
tenant buzzes you up."
"Let's start on the sixth floor and work our way down," Williams said
to Lumak.
The two men got into the elevator cab, and as it began its ascent,
Grossman ran up five flights of stairs to Kronstadt's apartment. As he
stood outside, his heart pounding both from his run and from fear, he
could hear the men knocking on apartment doors on the floor above
and asking for her. He could not hear the tenants' responses. He
knocked rapidly but quietly on her door, and she opened it.
Grossman rushed into the room and closed and locked the door
behind him. Before a bewildered Sylvia Kronstadt, he turned off the
radio, doused the lights, and whispered, "Don't say a wordi"
Instantly, there was a banging on her door. Grossman and Kronstadt
stood silently, not moving, as the noise continued. When she heard the
voice of her caller, she understood.
"Sylvia," yelled Lumak, "'we know you're in there. Let us in."
They made no response. The banging continued.
For twenty minutes, Grossman and Kronstadt stood frozen, while
Lumak and Williams alternately banged on the door and listened for
a response. Without a telephone Kronstadt could not call the police.
Finally, there was a long period of silence, and it seemed that the in-
truders had left. Kronstadt tiptoed to the door to peer through the
peephole. As she neared it, a floorboard creaked.
The banging resumed immediately. "Now we're sure that you're
inside," called Lumak.
Twenty minutes longer the banging continued. Finally it stopped.
An upstairs neighbor had summoned the police because she could not
sleep. Lumak explained that the person they wanted to visit seemed
not to be at home, so the men and the police left without speaking to
Kronstadt. She sent Grossman home and went to sleep.
At three o'clock in the morning she was awakened by the ringing of
her intercom buzzer. She did not answer it, and it continued to ring
intermittently for an hour. When it stopped at four, she went back to
bed.
As she was leaving for work that morning, a neighbor stopped her
in the vestibule. "Say, two fellows were looking for you this morning,
about half an hour ago. Did they find you?"
That day, Henry Stern called Ron Lumak and informed him that
Sylvia Kronstadt was an investigator for the Department of Consumer
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Affairs, and that while Lumak might be excused for harassing her be-
fore he knew her mission, the Department expected that he would
refrain, from that point on, from any further contact with her. Lumak
was speechless. He had not memorized a script for this occasion. The
undercover phase of our investigation was at an end.
The case was now at a critical juncture. We had to decide whether
to follow a judicial or a direct action strategy. We would undoubtedly
have selected a direct action strategy without prolonged deliberation
had not our doubts about our own methods during the investigative
stage provoked a more searching inquiry.
We had to face the fact that the use of unorthodox methods had led
to a situation where we believed an employee's life may have been in
danger. Was it worth it? Did the company's deception of its customers
and its contempt for them justify the actions we had taken, and more
particularly, did they justify further direct action of our part? While we
had become cynical about stopping fraud by going to court, who were
we to use other methods, at physical risk to the young men and women
of the Division, if society did not care to provide the means for dealing
with such matters in a judicial forum?
Before making the inevitable strategic and ethical judgment, we
considered the specific tactics that we might employ. If we chose the
judicial route, we would have to start by trying to subpoena records of
recent sales. We could never get a preliminary injunction without con-
sumer affidavits. Yet despite the most extensive undercover work we'd
ever engaged in, which had revealed a serious pattern of consumer
fraud, we still had no consumer complaints or even the names of con-
sumers who had recently purchased materials. The company was not
yet suing people, so names of parties could not be culled from court
records. They would have to come from the company itself, which we
knew would be beginning an intensive summer selling season in a few
weeks. If Lumak chose to fight the subpoena in court, he would prob.
ably lose, but he could avoid giving us the documents until fall at the
earliest. And by appealing, he could delay until winter or spring. Then
it would take more months before we could obtain the necessary affi-
davits and present the case to a court for decision.
We listed the possible alternatives for direct action. The company
obtained sales girls by advertising in the Village Voice and the New
York Times. We could inform those media of what we had learned,
and they might refuse to carry further advertising.
We could issue a press release relating what we had discovered about
the company. That was unlikely to be effective. People do not remem-
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ber the names of companies they are warned to look out for, and if
they did, Lumak could change the company's name. Furthermore,
newspapers in New York, we had found, did not devote substantial
space to stories of consumer fraud unless a big-name company was
involved (and sometimes not even then), or unless the Department took
unusual measures to indicate to the press the importance of the story.r
If we held a public hearing we could play our tape recordings, and
the result might be sensational. But what were we to make of the
charge, frequently hurled at the Department by businesses it attacks,
and certain to be made by Superior, that we were "trying the case in
the press rather than in the courts"? Did this slogan speak to an impor-
tant ethical principle deeply rooted in the American legal system, and
therefore to be respected? Or was it merely the standard reflex reaction
of those whose actions cannot withstand public scrutiny to a tactic
which has been used frequently by government, with at least tacit sup-
port from the public?
We also considered, at least in conversation, even more unorthodox
approaches. Would it be improper, we wondered, for Department em-
ployees, such as paraprofessionals, to picket Lumak's offices, carrying
signs explaining what the company did? If that was going too far, or
even if it were merely an inefficient use of Department resources, it
might be possible for the paraprofessionals to organize a genuine com-
munity action group to picket this and other companies regularly. Was
45. We had taken such measures once before, successfully. By promising that they
would earn S1200 per month selling shares in Kansas oil ventures to foreigners, a New
York City company had induced dozens of unskilled laborers to withdraw their savings
and turn over to the company a $3000 "bond," ostensibly to insure that once abroad "at
the company's expense" the prospective salesmen would work, instead of vacation. The
bond, they were told, would be refunded when the salesmen had made a certain number
of sales. The victims of this fraud were given one-way tickets to European cities, and told
to go to particular hotels to attend training sessions and pick up sales kits and lists of
prospects; they were also told that hotel reservations had been made for them. When
they arrived, there were no training sessions, no sales kits, no prospects and no reserva-
tions, and they were stranded abroad, unable to maintain themselves and equally unable
to return to file a complaint.
A few did manage to straggle back, however, and our quick investigation revealed that
the company was still sending people abroad. The usual delay involved in using the
courts was out of the question and, among other things, most of the wimesses were out
of the country and could not be brought before the court to testify; we could not even
locate them to get affidavits.
Direct action in that case consisted of hiring a room at the New York City Bar Associa-
tion on a Saturday morning, and there convening an investigatory hearing, with the
press invited. Henry Stern played the role of hearing officer; my staff and I presented the
victims who had made it back. The company was notified and invited to come and ross-
examine; it chose not to. Stern made no findings at the time, nor were they necessary.
The witnesses were featured on the evening television news, and stories appeared in the
major newspapers, including a picture story on page four of the Sunday News. A few
days later, the company stopped doing business, and although this technique did not pro-
duce refunds, it stopped the fraud almost instantly.
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that a legitimate government function? What about picketing Lumak's
house in Brooklyn, so that his neighbors would know the type of
business in which he engaged? Was that any less proper than publiciz-
ing his activities in the newspaper? Picketing businessmen's homes had
been done by community groups protesting real estate block busters.
Was it unethical for the government to participate?
We recalled also that Lumak had told Kronstadt that a single person
who announced her qualms during a training session could cause dis-
sension in an entire group. It occurred to us that we might send an
employee, or a volunteer, to each one of Lumak's training sessions. The
agent would ask questions such as, "Isn't it wrong to lie to people?" in
an effort to encourage all the others to evaluate their own participation.
Was this wrong? And we considered organizing a "truth squad" to
follow his salesgirls around in the neighborhoods, telling each mother
how much the company's products really cost, and that the company
was a commercial venture unrelated to Sesame Street, any survey or-
ganization, or any real research project. Finally, we considered inform-
ing the company's suppliers of its activities, and suggesting to them
that we might have to investigate whether their acquiescence in their
customers' fraudulent use of their products involved them in any
violation of law.
All of these tactics had to be measured against invocation of the
judicial system, and we had nothing but our suspicions to support our
feeling that Lumak would use all available delaying tactics to oppose
us in court.
Committing ourselves to neither a judicial nor a direct action strat-
egy, we put a toe in each pond. On June 21, 1971, we served a subpoena
on Lumak and, as expected, he retained Cates, who began a predictably
slow court battle over the subpoena's validity. We also informed the
Village Voice and the New York Times that the "interviewer" positions
for which the company was advertising were really sales jobs, and we
told those newspapers what we had learned about the company's sales
methods. The Voice stopped accepting the advertising; the Times trans.
ferred it to the "Sales Help Wanted" column. This, however, did not
appreciably reduce the number of girls who sought jobs from Superior
Research. Thus, when I left, the Department was faced with a pressing
strategic and ethical question which the case would force it to resolve.40
46. Faith in the judiciary springs eternal. The Department chose to suspend direct
pressure while seeking judicial enforcement of its June subpoena. The company's motion
to quash was submitted to the court early in July. Late in August, the court ruled In
favor of the Department. But then the judge went on a month's vacation, so It was Ira.
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III. A Pig is Born
Perhaps it is merely a coincidence that the results I have reported
in the Foolproof direct action case were more satisfactory than in the
Kramer's judicial action case. 47 But I think not. In general, the Law
Enforcement Division has been most successful when it has sought to
prevent fraud or obtain refunds on its own rather than in court.
Of course, it is somewhat early to hazard forecasts of long-term
trends. Kramer's, and other cases in which we pressed a judicial
strategy, have not been closed, and the Department may yet nail down
solid victories against those companies in the courts. But it is significant,
I think, that a number of those cases were among the first investigated
by the Law Enforcement Division.
Of course, we did not initially perceive that we might pursue distinct,
alternative approaches. This option dawned on us only gradually, as
did the awareness of our greater effectiveness when we chose not to go
to court. Those of us who were lawyers were immensely saddened by
this perception, on a theoretical level, because a model of law enforce-
ment which we respected did not work-it let swindlers continue to
swindle-and on a practical level, because if we could feel the courts
driving us out of the normal channels into a kind of street warfare, we
imagined that the police must feel the pressure a hundredfold.
All of us in the Law Enforcement Division were civil libertarians.
We applauded the Supreme Court decision requiring policemen to
warn suspects that their admissions could be used against them, and
scoffed at police officials who claimed that the case would "hamstring"
possible for Ratner to submit an order for him to sign which could be served on the
company. When the judge returned early in October, Ratner mailed his proposed order to
the court. For three weeks, he heard nothing. Then he called the clerk. The clerk could
not find the order.
The next week, the clerk found the proposed order and mailed it back to Ratner,
unsigned; Ratner's draft was defective in several formal respects. For example, the 'ord
"enter" above the line for the judge's signature was on the right of the page, instead of
being centered.
Ratner submitted a new draft, which the judge signed at the end of October. Ratner
served the order on the company, demanding a hearing on November 4.
On the hearing date, a new lawyer for the company appeared at the Department,
demanding a week's postponement so that he could familiarize himself vith the case.
Reluctantly, Ratner gave him a week. During that time, the company appealed the deci-
sion against it, and the appellate court stayed the hearing pending appeal. The appeal was
scheduled for early January; a decision might be expected by early 1972. If the Depart-
ment's position were sustained, and the company chose not to appeal further, the Law
Enforcement Division could begin its investigation.
47. Of course these were not the only direct or judicial action cases undertaken by
the Department. Other cases have not been discussed in this particular article for reasons
of space. Foolproof and Kramer's are, however, representative of the direct action and
judicial action models. For a fuller discussion, see P. ScHRac, CouNsE.. roR rin DEcr.tn:
CASE SrTrDIs IN CONSUAMR FRAUD (1972) (in press).
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law enforcement officials. We condemned eavesdropping and wire-
tapping. We decried the loss of privacy in American life. We demon-
strated when police forces took the law into their own hands and beat
kids over the head, or when they stood by passively while construction
workers did so. We protested the use of informers and secret agents to
convict Jimmy Hoffa.
Yet here we were, after experiencing for only one year the frustra-
tions of law enforcement, eager to emulate every police trick we
despised, and indeed, ready to invent a few of our own. By the end of
that year we had an impressive inventory of electronic gadgetry, in-
cluding a subminiature tape recorder with one microphone that looked
like a vest-pocket fountain pen and another that hooked onto a bra-
strap.4 1 We thought of the press as one of a number of arrows for our
bow, rather than the safeguard of a free people against oppressive gov-
ernment. We first learned that the government had to lie when we
discovered that many subpoenas could not be served unless we used a
ruse to get into the presence of a company's officers. By the end of the
year, we were routinely engaging in deception to fight deception, and
even the use of wired secret agents to infiltrate companies was becoming
commonplace.
A lunch table conversation revealed that all of us were horrified at
J. Edgar Hoover's pre-trial release to the press of the alleged corre-
spondence between Father Berrigan and Sister McAlister concerning
the possible kidnapping of Henry Kissinger. Was that public statement
so different from the public hearing we were contemplating for Su-
perior Research?49 We regarded blacklisting of film artists during the
McCarthy era as one of the darkest hours of the Constitution-was it
so different from our sometimes subtle, sometimes not-so-subtle hints
to newspapers, magazines, banks, stores, and other institutions that one
of their customers was cheating people, although no court had so
determined? We feared the advent of a national data bank, a computer
in Washington with dossiers on every American, culled from the rec-
ords of every local, state and federal agency with which a person had
contact from birth to death. Yet we encouraged and actively partici-
pated in the creation of a consumer complaint data bank, now being
assembled in a computer in Washington by the Federal Trade Com-
48. One hazard of a very young law enforcement staff: on the day this microphone
was to be used for the first time, our investigator forgot to wear a bra.
49. Indeed, was Hoover's statement any different from the public hearing we had cott-
ducted at the New York City Bar Association exposing a company which spedalized in
defrauding unskilled laborers? See note 41 supra.
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mission, in which are recorded the details of every complaint about a
company made to every consumer protection agency in the country,
including, of course, the company's name.
What was enforcing the law-which ought to be a matter of some
pride-doing to us? After her service as a secret agent, Sylvia Kronstadt
told me, "I haven't resolved it myself. I'm not proud at all of having
spied, and I'm not proud to admit to the people who pay me, the
citizens, that I've done that. But I think Lumak is a crook."
We were driven to direct action and to use unpleasant investigative
techniques, by sympathy with the victims of consumer fraud and by
what we regarded as a breakdown in the system of civil justice. But
what the police experience is much worse, in both respects. We talked,
day by day, with people who had been gypped out of a few dozen or a
few hundred dollars. Their stories enraged us. The police, by contrast,
see the victims of physical violence-people who have been robbed,
shot, and raped; they often talk to victims of crime who are still shaking
with fright. Contact with these persons must anger the young police-
man, must create in him a determination to apprehend and punish the
offender, one way or another. And when he turns to the courts, he
discovers that the system of criminal justice has failed more completely
than the system of civil justice. When a man is released on bail and
fails to appear for trial, his bail is forfeited and a bench warrant is
issued for his arrest. But in New York City, only two out of seven of
these warrants are ever executed.50 The failures of the correctional
system produce much public talk and in some cases violent death, but
little willingness to spend money for improvement; the recidivism
rate climbs higher. Finally, the decisions of the courts probably have
made it harder to convict some of the guilty, particularly the profes-
sionals. I am quite certain that fewer of the businessmen we interro-
gated would have cooperated if we had started their hearings with
Miranda warnings.
Of course there are differences between the steps we took and the
actions we condemn the police and the F.B.I. for taking. We were deal-
ing with companies, not individuals. And most of the ethically de-
batable measures we took were neither specifically permitted nor
specifically prohibited by law, while, for example, beating up an alleged
rapist is clearly illegal. But these distinctions go only so far. Some
corporations--such as Superior Research-are basically the creation
50. See Rothwax, The Criminal Court: Problems and Proposals, in RE'oRr To Ta
Nme Yom~ CRnmmAL Jus"cE CooRDINA'mG Coucm (1970).
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and embodiment of one individual. Indeed, some companies are not
corporations at all, but partnerships or individual proprietorships. To
strike at these companies is really to strike at the earning power of the
individuals behind them, and if the strike is successfully done by pub.
licity, it does seem a little like blacklisting a professional. Surely avoid-
ing specifically illegal actions does not free a public agency to do any-
thing else it pleases; its actions must be related to its mission.
But what is an agency's mission? How broadly or narrowly do we
define its powers when we, the public, create an institution? The ques-
tion cannot be answered by consulting the people who wrote the stat-
ute. I wrote the Consumer Protection Law, from the first draft to the
final version, and while I can offer a good deal of advice on what busi-
ness conduct it permits and prohibits, I have no idea what agency
conduct it permits or prohibits. Nor are the critics of the statute-writers
much help. I told a seminar of law professors about the Department's
activities in the Foolproof case, and the responses ranged from general
approval-"that's exactly what government agencies should be doing"
-to condemnation.
Obviously, the puzzle should be avoided rather than solved. We
should streamline and liberalize the law enforcement process so that
backlogs are eliminated, delay made impossible, bureaucracy sur-
pressed, and judges sensitized to justice. Meanwhile, conscientious law
enforcement agencies will continue to be stretched between their con-
cepts of service and their devotion to the judicial system. It's a hell of a




THE CITY OF NEW YORK
FOR THE YEAR 1969
No. 83
A LOCAL LAW to amend the New York city charter and the administrative code of the
city of New York, in relation to unfair trade practices.
Be it enacted by the Council as follows:
Section 1. Subdivision e of section 2203 of Chapter 64 of the New York City charter as
enacted by local law 68 for the year 1968, is hereby amended to read as follows:
(e) The commission, in the performance of said functions, shall be authorized to hold
public and private hearings, administer oaths, take testimony, serve subpoenas, receive
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evidence, and to receive, administer, pay over and distribute monies collected in and as
a result of actions brought for violations of laws relating to deceptive or unconscionable
trade practices or of related laws, and to promulgate, amend and modify procedures and
practices governing such proceedings, and to promulgate, amend, and modify rules and
regulations necessary to carry out the powers and duties of the department.
Section 2. The administrative code of the dty of New York is hereby amended by adding
thereto a new chapter, to be chapter sixty-four, to read as follows:
CHAPTER 64
DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS
TITLE A
Consumer Protection Law of 1969
§ 2203d-1.0 Unfair trade practices prohibited.-No person shall engage in any decep-
tive or unconscionable trade practice in the sale, lease, rental or loan or in the offering for
sale, lease, rental, or loan of any consumer goods or services, or in the collection of
consumer debts.
§ 2203d-2.0 Definitions.-a. Deceptive trade practice. Any false, falsely disparaging, or
misleading oral or written statement, visual description or other representation of any
kind made in connection with the sale, lease, rental or loan or in connection with the
offering for sale lease, rental, or loan of consumer goods or services, or in the extension of
consumer credit or in the collection of consumer debts, which has the capacity, tendency
or effect of deceiving or misleading consumers. Deceptive trade practices include but arc
not limited to: (I) representations that goods or services have sponsorship, approval,
accessories characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities that they do not have,
the supplier has a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or connection that he does not
have; goods are original or new if they are deteriorated, altered, reconditioned, reclaimed,
or secondhand; or, goods or services are of particular standard, quality, grade, st)le or
model, if they are of another; (2) the use, in any oral or written repraentation, of
exaggeration, innuendo or ambiguity as to a material fact or failure to state a material
fact if such use deceives or tends to deceive; (3) disparaging the goods, services, or business
of another by false or misleading representations of material facts; (4) offering goods or
services with intent not to sell them as offered; (5) offering goods or services with intent
not to supply reasonable expectable public demand, unless the offer discloses to limitation
of quantity, and (6) making false or misleading representations of fact concerning the
reasons for, existence of, or amounts of price reductions, or price in comparison to prices
of competitors or one's own price at a past or future time. (7) stating that a consumer
transaction involves consumer rights, remedies or obligations that it does not involve;
(8) stating that services, replacements or repairs are needed if they are not; and (9) falsely
stating the reasons for offering or supplying goods or services at scale discount prices.
b. Unconscionable trade practice. Any act or practice in connection with the sale, lease
rental or loan or in connection with the offering for sale, lease, rental or loan of any
consumer goods or services, or in the extension of consumer credit, or in the collection
of consumer debts which unfairly takes advantage of the lack of knowledge, ability
experience or capacity of a consumer; or results in a gross disparity between the value
received by a consumer and the price paid, to the consumer's detriment; provided that no
act or practice shall be deemed unconscionable under this title unless declared unconscion-
able and described with reasonable particularity in a local law, or in a rule or regulation
promulgated by the commissioner. In promulgating such rules and regulations the com-
missioner shall consider among other factors: (1) knowledge by merchants engaging in
the act or practice of the inability of consumers to receive properly anticiat benefits
from the goods or services involved; (2) gross disparity between the price of goods or
services and their value measured by the price at which similar goods or services are
readily obtained by other consumers; (3) the fact that the acts or practices may enable
merchants to take advantage of the inability of consumers reasonably to protect their
interests by reason of physical or mental infirmities, illiteracy or inability to understand
the language of the agreement, ignorance or lack of education, or similar factors; (4) the
degree to which terms of the transaction require consumers to waive legal rights; (5) the
degree to which terms of the transaction require consumers to jeopardize money or
property beyond the money or property immediately at issue in the tran-,action; and
(6) definitions of unconscionability in statutes, regulations rulings and decisions of legisla-
tive, or judicial bodies in this state or elsewhere.
c. Consumer goods, services, credit and debts. As used in §§ 2203d-1.0, 2203-2.0 (a) and
2203d-2.0 (b) of this title, goods services, credit and debts which are primarily for personal,
hoseb-old or family purposes.
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d. Consumer. A purchaser or lessee or prospective purchaser or lessee of the consumer
goods or services or consumer credit, including a co-obligor or surety.
e. Merchant. A seller, lessor, creditor or any other person who makes available either
directly or indirectly, goods, services or credit, to consumers. "Merchant" shall include
manufacturers, wholesalers and others who are responsible for any act or practice pro.
hibited by this title.
f. Commissioner. Shall mean the commissioner of consumer affairs.
§ 2203d-3.0 Regulations-The commissioner may adopt such rules and regulations
as may be necessary to effectuate the purposes of this title, including regulations defining
specific deceptive or unconscionable trade practices.
Such rules and regulations may supplement but shall not be inconsistent with the
rules, regulations and decisions of the Federal Trades Commission and the Federal courts
in interpreting the provisions of Section 5 (a) (1), or the Federal Trade Commission Act
15 U.S.C. 45 (a) (1), or the decisions of the courts interpreting General Business Law §350
and Uniform Commercial Code §2-302.
§ 2203d-4.0 Enforcement.-a. The violation of any provision of this title or of any
rule or regulation promulgated thereunder, shall be punishable upon proof thereof, by
the payment of a civil penalty in the sum of fifty dollars to three hundred and fifty
dollars, to be recovered in a civil action.
b. The knowing violation of any provision of this title or of any rule or regulation
promulgated thereunder, shall be punishable upon conviction thereof, by the payment of
a civil penalty in the sum of five hundred dollars, or as a violation for which a fine in
the sum of five hundred dollars shall be imposed, or both.
c. Upon a finding by the commissioner of repeated, multiple or ersistent violation of
any provision of this title or of any rule or regulation promulgates thereunder, the city
may except as hereinafter provided, bring an action to compel the defendant or defendants
in such action to pay in court all monies, property or other things, or proceeds thereof,
received as a result of such violations; to direct that the amount of money or the property
or other things recovered be paid into an account established pursuant to section two
thousand six hundred one of the civil practice law and rules from which shall be paid
over to any and all persons who purchased the goods or services during the period of
violation such sum as was paid by them in a transaction involving the prohibited acts
or practices, plus any costs incurred by such claimants in making and pursuing their
complaints; provided that if such claims exceed the sum recovered into the account, the
awards to consumers shall be prorated according to the value of each claim proved; to
direct the defendant or defendants, upon conviction, pay to the city the costs, and
disbursements of the action and pay to the city for the use of the commissioner the costs
of his investigation leading to the judgment; or if not recovered from defendants, such
costs are to be deducted by the city from the grand recovery before distribution to the
consumers; and to direct that any money, property, or other things in the account and
unclaimed by any persons with such claims witin one year from creation of the account,
be paid to the city, to be used by the commissioner for further consumer law enforcement
activities. Consumers making claims against an account established pursuant to this
subsection shall prove their claims to the commissioner in a manner and subject to
procedures established by the commissioner for that purpose. The procedures established
in each case for proving claims shall not be employed until approved by the court,
which shall also establish by order the minimum means by which the commissioner shall
notify potential claimants of the creation of the account. Restitution pursuant to it
judgment in an action under this subdivision shall bar, pro tanto, the recovery of any
damages in any other action against the same defendant or defendants on account of the
same acts or practices which were the basis for such judgment, up to the time of the
judgment, by any person to whom such restitution is made. Restitution under this sub.
section shall not apply to transactions entered into more than five years prior to commence.
ment of an action by the commissioner. Before instituting an action under this subsection,
the commissioner shall give the prospective defendant written notice of the poslble
action, and an opportunity to demonstrate in writing within five days, that no repeated,
multiple, or persistent violations have occurred.
d. Whenever any person has engaged in any acts or practices which constitute violations
of any provision of this title or of any rule or regulation promulgated thereunder, the
city may make application to the supreme court for an order enjoying such acts or
practices and for an order granting a temporary or permanent injunction, restraining
order, or other order enjoining such acts or practices.
e. To establish a cause of action under this section it need not be shown that consumers
are being or were actually injured.
§ 2203-5.0 Settlements.-a. In lieu of instituting or continuing an action pursuant to
this title, the commissioner may accept written assurance of discontinuance of any act or
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practice in violation of this title from the person or persons who have engaged in such
acts or practices. Such assurance may include a stipulation for voluntary payinent by the
violator of the costs of investigation by the commissioner and may also include a stipula-
tion for the restitution by the violator to consumers, of money property or other things
received from them in connection with a violation of this title, including money necessarily
expended in the course of making and pursuing a complaint to the commissioner. All
settlements shall be made a matter of public record.
If such stipulation applies to consumers who have been affected by the violator's
practices but have not yet complained to the commissioner, the assurance must be ap-
proved by the court, which shall direct the minimum means by which potential claimants
shall be notified of the stipulation. A consumer need not accept restitution pursuant to
such a stipulation; his acceptance shall bar recovery of any other damages in any action
by him against the defendant or defendants on account of the same acts or practices.
b. Violation of an assurance entered into pursuant to this section shall be treated as a
violation of this title, and shall be subject to all the penalties provided therefor.
§ 2203d-6.0 Persons excluded from this title.-Nothing in this title shall apply to any
television or radio broadcasting station or to any publisher or printer of a newspaper,
magazine, or other form of printed advertising, who broadcasts, publishes, or prints such
advertisement, except insofar as said station or publisher or printer is guilty of deception
in the sale of offering for sale of its own services. This title shall not apply to advertising
agencies, provided they are acting on information provided by their clients.
§ 2203d-7.0 Permitted Practices--The provisions of this statute sAall be construed so
as to supplement the rules, regulations, and decisions of the FTC and the courts inter-
preting 15 U.S.C. Sec. 45(a)(1), but the provisions of the statute shall in no instance be
interpreted in a manner inconsistent with the rules, regulations and decisions of the FTC
and the courts interpreting 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1).
§ 2203d-8.0 Separability.-If any provision of this title or the application of such
provisions to any person or circumstances shall be held unconstitutional or invalid, the
constitutionality or validity of the remainder of this title and the applicability of such
provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
§ 5. This local law shall take effect one month after enactment, except that tie com-
missioner may immediately hold hearings with regard to proposed regulations, and pro-
mulgate such regulations pursuant to § 2203d-3.0. Findings of repeated or persistent
violations of this Act shall pertain only to acts or practices engaged in after the effective
date hereof.
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